
Author: Bipin Adhikari

Constitutional experts, however, say there is still room for a coalition government to be formed as per Article 168 (2). “The provincial chief could have called for a coalition government,” senior advocate Bipin Adhikari, a professor at Kathmandu University School of Law, told the Post. “It wasn’t necessary to jump to the last option for government formation provisioned by Article 168 (5).”
The Koshi Province head has called for the formation of a new government following the resignation of Chief Minister Hikmat Karki on Saturday.
Province Head Parshuram Khapung invited the parties represented in the provincial assembly to form a government by Friday as per Article 168 (5) of the constitution. As per the clause, any lawmaker who presents a ground on which he or she can get a vote of confidence in the assembly is appointed the chief minister.
Karki, also the provincial assembly leader of the CPN-UML, opted to resign after seeing no sign of winning the vote of confidence. The Koshi Assembly was called on Saturday for a floor test.
“The present numbers game in the provincial assembly is sure to push us towards the midterm elections. We are ready to face it,” said Karki, announcing his resignation in the assembly. “However, snap polls are not the need of the hour. Our party is ready for every sort of negotiation.”
Karki was appointed the chief minister following a Supreme Court verdict on September 7. He led a minority government as per Article 168 (3) of the Constitution on September 8. It was a constitutional obligation for him to win the floor test by Saturday.
Karki had the support of only 40 assembly members from his party, including deputy speaker Srijana Danuwar, who has chaired the meetings following the Speaker’s resignation. The one chairing the assembly can vote only when there is a tie.
Karki needed the support of a minimum of 47 members in the 93-strong assembly and was short of seven members to win the floor test. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), which allied with the UML, was ready to support him, but only in a situation where Karki would win the confidence vote.
With 40 seats, the UML is the largest party in the assembly. The Congress has 29 seats, the CPN (Maoist Centre) 12, the RPP six, the CPN (Unified Socialist) four, and the Janata Samajbadi Party one.
“It was better to quit when it became certain that Karki would lose the confidence motion. Despite serious discussions with different parties, we couldn’t garner the support we needed,” Rewati Raman Bhandari, the UML chief whip in the provincial assembly, told the Post.
Several attempts by the UML to sow divisions in the Congress-led camp failed. The party had tried to get the support of at least one lawmaker from among the Maoists, the Congress and the Unified Socialist. The plan didn’t work out, leaving the chief minister with no alternative but to resign.
Now, any provincial member from any party can make a claim by presenting the signatures of at least 47 members. In that case, the province head appoints such a member as the chief minister. The chief minister appointed under 168(5) also needs to secure a vote of confidence within a month.
“Since the government formed as per Article 168 (3) has collapsed, the only option left was to call for 168 (5),” Uddhav Thapa, the Congress parliamentary party leader and former chief minister, told the Post.
Constitutional experts, however, say there is still room for a coalition government to be formed as per Article 168 (2). “The provincial chief could have called for a coalition government,” senior advocate Bipin Adhikari, a professor at Kathmandu University School of Law, told the Post. “It wasn’t necessary to jump to the last option for government formation provisioned by Article 168 (5).”
Against the claim by UML leaders that the resignation doesn’t equal being voted out, Adhikari said Karki’s resignation means he failed to win the confidence of the assembly, even without a vote, technically.
Leaders from the Congress and the Maoist Centre parties have started their homework for government formation even before getting the call from the provincial head. “I, naturally, have a claim to the chief ministerial position,” said Thapa. He said his party was already in the negotiations with the RPP and was confident of its support.
Indra Bahadur Angbo, parliamentary party leader of the Maoist Centre, has also claimed the post of chief minister. Support from the RPP is a must for the Congress-led alliance to prove its majority.
The RPP, however, remains undecided. “Yes, we are in negotiations but no decision has been made. Our president, Rajendra Lingden, has the authority to decide on the matter,” Bhakti Sitaula, the RPP provincial assembly leader, told the Post. The Congress-led alliance has offered the Speaker’s post to the party in exchange for its support. “Our party will make its position clear,” said Sitaula.
If the chief minister appointed under 168(5) also fails to secure majority votes within a month, the Koshi Province will head toward mid-term elections.
An edited version of the oral submission given by Prof Bipin Adhikari to the Sub-Committee on TRC (Third Amendment) Bill at the Parliamentary Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights on July 24, 2023.
The Government of Nepal has tabled the Act on Commission on Investigation of Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation, 2071 [TRC] (Third Amendment) Bill in Parliament. While there are no universally binding international standards specifically governing the establishment and operation of commissions like TRC, various international bodies and organisations have provided guidelines and principles.
The United Nations, for instance, has recommended a transitional justice process that covers truth-seeking processes, reparations and prosecutions for serious crimes. The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and other organisations have published valuable resources and principles that can serve as references for countries considering or implementing TRCs. Nepal is committed to adhering to these guidelines and learning from other TRCs worldwide to ensure fairness, accountability and respect for human rights during reconciliation.
Some core concerns
Before delving into the specific details of the Amendment Bill, it is necessary to emphasise that granting a general amnesty in all cases of human rights violations during the conflict is not a credible process. Universally, providing legal pardon or immunity to individuals involved in such violations is deemed unacceptable. In no circumstances should amnesty be granted to those accused of committing serious human rights violations during the conflict. It is essential to prioritise accountability and ensure that perpetrators are held responsible for their actions to uphold the integrity of the transitional justice process. Granting amnesty, particularly in cases of grave violations, could undermine the principles of justice and accountability.
Ensuring the safety and protection of witnesses and victims who come forward to testify has also been a critical issue in Nepal. Witness protection mechanisms are essential to encourage individuals to share their testimonies without fear of retaliation. Unfortunately, public awareness about the TRC processes is lacking, resulting in limited participation and engagement from the wider public and victims. Furthermore, the TRC has faced challenges related to its leadership, institutional capacity, resources and expertise, affecting their ability to conduct comprehensive investigations and deliver justice effectively.
The Supreme Court of Nepal has taken various stands on issues related to the TRC process, including actively addressing legal challenges and controversies. Notably, the top court has forcefully stated that amnesties for serious human rights violations committed during the conflict are not permissible. It is evident in its opinion that the Act must be in line with international standards. The apex court’s concerns about accountability and ensuring justice for victims should not be overlooked.
The Amendment Bill
Compared with many other jurisdictions, the original Act and the Amendment Bill are in good shape. However, considering the concerns of the victims and the general public, some reforms are still necessary in the given context.
The effort to classify human rights violations between “violations of human rights” and “serious violations of human rights” seems acceptable. However, the principle of classification in the context of the right to equality refers to the idea that if a law treats different groups of people unequally, there must be a reasonable and rational basis for such differentiation. The classification should have an objective and intelligible differentia that distinguishes the groups and a rational nexus with the purpose of the law. In other words, the classification should not be arbitrary or discriminatory and should be based on relevant and reasonable considerations to ensure equality before the law.
The legislators must revise the inadequate classification proposed in Sections 2(j) and 2(j1). For example, it is necessary to explain in what sense “gender-related violence” is different from “rape”, as the existing criminal law deals with the latter offence in specific ways. There is a possibility of misinterpretation here.
There is no problem with the special court as proposed by the Amendment Bill to hear the transitional justice cases. In fact, it is necessary on several grounds. However, it is objectionable that the Government of Nepal will appoint the court judges in consultation with the Judicial Council. Even if these judges are to be appointed by the government from among the judges of the High Courts, there is no reason why the Judicial Council cannot be trusted to recommend judges for this appointment based on their qualifications and experience in transitional justice. No matter how important the client is, they should not be allowed to select judges. At least in this case, the Government of Nepal cannot be trusted for this job.
Another problematic provision of the Bill is the power to drop a charge given to the Attorney General. The Attorney General of Nepal is a political appointee accountable to the prime minister. All major parties that served in the government during the conflict had explicit biases and prejudices. The Attorney General may be unable to resist pressure in exercising this power. As such, the Attorney General should pursue whatever the commission recommends for prosecution and be able to investigate further if needed, but they should not have the power to stop the case at the threshold in the exercise of their discretion.
Additionally, Section 29(5) of the proposed amendment is problematic. It allows the Attorney General or any public attorney to frame a charge against a perpetrator claiming a punishment less than what is prescribed by the law of the land. The Special Court can consider all aggravating situations or mitigating circumstances if the punishment, as prescribed by the law, becomes harsh on the perpetrator. The existing criminal laws and procedures empower the courts to exercise this power. The office of the public attorneys cannot be trusted to exercise this discretion judicially.
Moreover, Nepal already has enough criminal laws and procedures that provide rules and guidelines on the issue of sentencing. There is no reason why Section 29(d) of the Bill should state that the Special Court “shall” impose the sentence prescribed under the existing laws only after reducing it (given the context of transitional justice). This provision contributes to impunity, and it’s a poorly drafted clause. A court of law is presumed to have all powers to decide a case according to judicial standards. A provision that affects this power in such a blunt way is undoubtedly unconstitutional.
There is no need for an appellate provision in this ongoing process focused on transitional justice. Granting the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals concerning the Special Court would unnecessarily prolong the process. The Supreme Court already possesses extraordinary writ jurisdiction to address cases involving genuine grievances of violation of human rights from any quarter. In general, appeals could be detrimental to the effectiveness of the transitional justice process, so it is not recommended to implement them. We should trust the Supreme Court as the guardian of the Constitution.
Conclusion
There are other minor comments to consider. The issue of providing compensation is an essential function of the commission. Protecting the victims is a pressing concern, and creating a victim-friendly environment is equally necessary. These issues could be better addressed if credible and competent individuals are selected to run the commission. Unfortunately, the current situation is unsatisfactory, and disputes over leadership appointments are evident. As the Bill is still at the committee level in Parliament, the legislators have the opportunity to address these issues and concerns.

प्रमुख सत्ता साझेदार दलले समर्थन फिर्ता लिइसकेकाले प्रधानमन्त्री पुष्पकमल दाहाल नेतृत्वको सरकारले विश्वासको मतप्राप्त सरकारको हैसियतमा काम गर्न नसक्ने विज्ञहरू बताउँछन्।
नेपाली कांग्रेसका सभापति शेरबहादुर देउवाले साढे दुई वर्षपछि मात्रै प्रधानमन्त्री बनाउँछु भनेपछि नेकपा (माओवादी केन्द्र)का अध्यक्ष पुष्पकमल दाहाल पुस १० गते नेकपा (एमाले) अध्यक्ष केपी शर्मा ओलीलाई गुहार्न बालकोट पुगे। प्रतिनिधि सभाको दोस्रो ठूलो दलका अध्यक्ष ओलीले जम्मा ३२ सीट भएका दाहाललाई प्रधानमन्त्री बनाइदिए।
एमाले, राष्ट्रिय स्वतन्त्र पार्टी (रास्वपा), राष्ट्रिय प्रजातन्त्र पार्टी (राप्रपा), जनता समाजवादी पार्टी (जसपा) लगायत सात दलीय गठबन्धन बनेपछि दाहालले तेस्रो पटक प्रधानमन्त्री बन्ने अवसर पाए।
तर‚ सात दलीय गठबन्धनको सबैभन्दा ठूलो घटक एमालेले फागुन १५ मा दाहाल सरकारलाई दिएको समर्थन फिर्ता लियो। राप्रपाले फागुन १३ मै समर्थन फिर्ता लिएको थियो। रास्वपाका मन्त्रीहरूले पनि सरकार छाडिसकेका छन्।
संविधानको धारा १०० को २ मा सहभागी दलले समर्थन फिर्ता लिएमा ३० दिनभित्र विश्वासको मत लिनुपर्ने प्रावधान छ। तर‚ ३० दिन भनेको अधिकतम समय हो। संविधानविद् डा. विपिन अधिकारी भन्छन्, “संविधानले ढिलोमा ३० दिनभित्र विश्वासको मत लिइसक्नुपर्छ भनेको हो, संसद् पनि जारी रहेको र प्रमुख घटक नै बाहिरिएका वेला ३०औं दिन आएर लिनुपर्छ भनेको होइन।”
समर्थन गुमाइसकेकाले यो सरकारले विश्वासको मत पाइसकेको नियमित सरकारले जस्तो काम गर्न नमिल्ने अधिकारी बताउँछन्। उनी भन्छन्, “सरकार बनाएको गठबन्धन भत्किसकेकाले यो सरकारले आफ्नो हैसियत प्रमाणित नगरी नियमित काम गर्न मिल्दैन, सबै कामलाई यथास्थानमा राखेर विश्वासको मत परीक्षण गर्न लाग्नुपर्छ।”

On March 4, 2022, Nepal’s Supreme Court ordered the Office of the Registrar to register a writ petition against Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) for taking responsibility for 5,000 deaths during the decade-long insurgency.
The decision was made in response to a case filed by advocates Gyanendra Aaran and Kalyan Budhathoki, who are also conflict victims, after the Supreme Court Office of the Registrar refused to register their separate writ petitions on November 10, 2022. The office had claimed that the issue was related to transitional justice and that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was dealing with the cases. However, the division bench of justices Ishwor Prasad Khatiwada and Hari Prasad Phuyal scrapped the decision of the administration and ordered the petitions to be registered. The writ petitions will be registered on March 6, 2023 as requested by the petitioners.
The Supreme Court’s division bench clarified that in a case filed by Suman Adhikari against the prime minister and the Council of Ministers seven years ago, it ruled that there could be no amnesty or concession in cases involving serious violations of human rights. The court stated that it is imperative for the government to ensure timely justice for victims and not encourage impunity. The court also acknowledged the petitioner’s argument that, despite 16 years since the transitional justice process began, conflict victims had not received justice. The court noted that the two transitional justice mechanisms were effectively inactive and had failed to deliver meaningful results. The SC observed that the criminal justice process cannot remain inactive or ineffective, and the issue of justice and reparation for conflict victims should not be prolonged indefinitely. The court nullified the Registrar’s decision to refuse the petition, stating that at a time when transitional justice mechanisms are ineffective, it cannot be deemed constitutional, just, and logical to argue that the petitioner has no right to raise the issue.
The decade-long insurgency in Nepal, which started on February 13, 1996, officially ended after a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached with the government on November 21, 2006. It is estimated that around 17,000 people lost their lives during the conflict. In a speech on January 15, 2020, Prachanda, as the leader of the Maoist party that led the insurgency, took responsibility for the deaths of 5,000 people and stated that the state should take responsibility for the remaining deaths. The victims demanded legal action against Prachanda for the killings that he had claimed responsibility for. Prachanda stated that he could not run away from the responsibility of the 5,000 deaths but that people could not blame him for what he did not do.
Article 133(2) of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the extraordinary power to issue necessary and appropriate orders for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution or any other legal right for which no other remedy has been provided. This power also extends to situations where the remedy provided, although available, appears to be inadequate or ineffective. Additionally, the court may exercise this power for the settlement of any constitutional or legal question involved in any dispute of public interest or concern, providing appropriate remedies and enforcing such rights or settling disputes as necessary. It is clear that if the Supreme Court finds the process of the TRC and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons to be inadequate, ineffective, or lacking credibility, it can intervene and take necessary action for the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Therefore, the argument that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in cases involving the TRC and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons is baseless.

The coalition government led by Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal appears to be breaking apart in Nepal. On February 25th, a joint meeting of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party central executive committee and lawmakers decided to quit the coalition government and recall all the ministers from the Cabinet. Two days later, the CPN (UML) also withdrew from the government, leaving it without the majority in the House of Representatives it claimed two months ago. This raises the question of whether the government needs to prove its confidence in the House again. So far, Prime Minister Dahal has not made any comment on this matter. To shed light on the constitutional provisions, NEW SPOTLIGHT spoke with Kathmandu University constitutional law Professor Bipin Adhikari. The following are excerpts from the conversation.
By NEW SPOTLIGHT ONLINE March 4, 2023, 8:38 p.m.
When should a prime minister take the vote of confidence?
A Prime Minister should take a vote of confidence when they are facing a situation where they are unsure if they have the support of the majority of members in the House of Representatives, or if they want to demonstrate to the public that they have a strong mandate to continue in their role. Article 100(1) of the Constitution allows the Prime Minister to move a vote of confidence in this scenario.
Can you think of some clear scenarios where vote of confidence is a compulsion?
Yes, there are specific scenarios where a Prime Minister should take a vote of confidence. For instance, if a Prime Minister is forming a coalition government, minority government, or a government that is weaker than this, the Constitution requires that they take a vote of confidence within 30 days. This is necessary to demonstrate that they have the support of the majority of members and, therefore, have a mandate to govern. Similarly, when there is a split in the ruling party or the coalition, a vote of confidence is unavoidable. This situation has been explained by Article 100(2) of the Constitution.
If a Prime Minister is facing a political crisis, such as a major scandal or controversy, they may take a vote of confidence to demonstrate that they have the support of the majority and can continue to lead the country. Additionally, if a Prime Minister suffers a defeat in a significant vote, such as a budget vote or a vote on a significant policy proposal, they may need to take a vote of confidence according to Article 100(1) to determine whether they still have the support of the majority of members of the House to continue in their role.
What about the compulsion under Article 100(2) of the Constitution?
Yes, in simple terms, as I mentioned, this provision states that if the political party that the Prime Minister belongs to is divided, or if a political party in the coalition government withdraws its support, then the Prime Minister is required to table a motion in the House of Representatives within 30 days for a vote of confidence.
What does that mean?
This means that the Prime Minister has to seek a vote of confidence from the House of Representatives to prove that he or she still has the support of the majority of the members of the house. If the Prime Minister fails to win the vote of confidence, then he or she is required to resign from the post, and the President shall appoint a new Prime Minister on the recommendation of the House of Representatives.
What if the Prime Minister does not take a vote of confidence and nobody in the opposition demands it, as happened during the term of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli?
If a Prime Minister does not want to take a vote of confidence, they may be reluctant to do so for several reasons. It could be because they are confident that they have the support of the majority of MPs and do not see the need for a vote, or they may not want to risk losing the vote and being forced to resign.
However, in some cases, there may be pressure from opposition parties or even from within the Prime Minister’s own party for a vote of confidence to be taken. In such situations, if the Prime Minister refuses to take a vote of confidence, it could be seen as a sign of weakness or lack of confidence in their ability to lead the country. It could also lead to speculation about the Prime Minister’s hold on power and create further instability.
Since Article 100(4) does not allow a no confidence motion for the first two years after the appointment of the Prime Minister, will such a Prime Minister continue to rule even without a majority in the House of Representatives?
The principle of the parliamentary system of government is very clear: a Prime Minister must have a majority in the House of Representatives at all times in order to continue as the government. Ultimately, if a Prime Minister is faced with pressure to take a vote of confidence to prove this majority and chooses not to, it could have significant political implications and impact their ability to effectively govern the country.
Let me make my question clearer. Can the Prime Minister still rule even though he does not have the courage to prove his majority?
No. In such a situation, the opposition will make it difficult for the Prime Minister to proceed with house business. They must resign or prove their worth. The Prime Minister will have little option because they would not be able to pass any bills, approve any policies or programs, or even clear a simple resolution through the parliamentary process. How can they continue to resist?
Can the President advise the Prime Minister in such a situation to take the vote and end such a situation?
In parliamentary systems of government, the role of the President is often largely constitutional, and they do not have the power to advise the Prime Minister on matters related to parliamentary procedures or the functioning of the government. Generally, a President would not intervene. However, in the event of a government crisis, the President may need to advise the Prime Minister to take a vote of confidence as a way to end political instability and provide a clear mandate for the government to continue. While the President may be able to offer advice or guidance, it is up to the Prime Minister to decide whether to take the vote and to manage the political situation in a way that best serves the interests of the country.
Is it proper for the Prime Minister to delay the vote of confidence even within the period of 30 days just to garner enough support in the house?
Technically, it is not improper for a Prime Minister to delay the vote of confidence within the 30-day period if they need more time to garner support in the House, and manage his situation. However, the delay could be seen as a sign of weakness or lack of confidence in the Prime Minister’s ability to lead the country. It could also lead to speculation about the Prime Minister’s hold on power and create further instability. Therefore, it is generally considered better for the Prime Minister to take the vote of confidence as soon as possible within the 30-day period to demonstrate that they have the support of the majority of members in the House of Representatives.
Does this delay impact the status of the Prime Minister as the leader of the country?
Yes, the delay has its own impacts. Until the vote is taken, the government is considered a weak and ineffective government. If the Prime Minister does not have the majority in the House, it would not be appropriate to push his legislative agenda as if he does. This is because, until the vote of confidence is taken and he has proven that he has the support of the majority, he does not have the legitimate authority to act as the full-fledged Prime Minister. It would be advisable to wait until the vote of confidence is taken and he has established his authority as the legitimate Prime Minister with the support of the majority, before pushing any legislative agenda. This applies to his important business in the cabinet as well.
So when should Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal take the vote?
He should take a vote of confidence within 30 days to demonstrate that he still has the support of the majority of members and has the mandate to govern. Until that happens, it is generally advisable for the Prime Minister to maintain a low profile and avoid making any major policy decisions or announcements that could be perceived as controversial.

नेपालको संविधान–२०७२ ले सन्धि वा सम्झौता गर्ने नेपाल सरकारको अधिकारको प्रयोगका सम्बन्धमा धारा २७९ मा केही स्पष्ट प्रावधान उल्लेख गरेको छ । यी प्रावधानहरूको स्पष्टतालाई कायम राख्नु वा हुन सक्ने अपव्याख्याबाट जोगाउनु धेरै जरुरी भइसकेको देखिन्छ । एउटा प्रश्न बारम्बार उठ्दै छ— जलविद्युत् उत्पादित वस्तु हो वा प्राकृतिक स्रोत ? यसको जवाफले नेपालमा जलविद्युत् क्षेत्रमा कति वैदेशिक लगानी हुन सक्ला भन्ने प्रश्नको पनि उत्तर दिनेछ ।
नेपालमा बृहत्तर लगानीको खाँचो छ । आन्तरिक पुँजीको परिचालन यसको एउटा पक्ष हो भने अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय स्तरमा उपलब्ध प्रत्यक्ष वैदेशिक लगानी (एफडीआई) लाई आकर्षित गर्नु अर्को । एफडीआईका लागि अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय प्रतिस्पर्धा बेजोडको छ । एफडीआईलाई नेपाल भित्र्याउन नसक्ने हो भने एक्काइसौं शताब्दीको नेपालका लोकमार्ग, सार्वजनिक यातायात, रेल्वे, सुरुङमार्ग, विमानस्थल, ऊर्जा, खनिजजस्ता पूर्वाधार विकासका हाल पाइपलाइनमा भएका अधिकांश ठूला योजना कार्यान्वयन गर्न सम्भव हुनेछैन । बृहत्तर लगानीलाई ख्यालख्यालमा लिनु हुँदैन । यसका लागि मुलुकमा लगानीमैत्री वातावरण चाहिन्छ । यो वातावरणलाई मुलुकको संवैधानिक कानुनको अपव्याख्या गरी मासिन दिनु हुँदैन ।
हालैका आँकडाहरूले के देखाउँछन् भने, नेपालमा एफडीआईको प्रवाह सोचेजस्तो हुन सकेको छैन । यस आर्थिक वर्षका पहिला छ महिनामा विदेशी पुँजी निवेश ९३.४ प्रतिशतले घटेको छ । एकातिर, एफडीआई घटेको छ, अर्कातिर वैदेशिक लगानीकर्ताले नेपालबाट अन्य मुलुकमा पठाउने रकम बढ्दो छ । अर्थात्, वैदेशिक लगानीकर्ताले नेपालबाट प्राप्त मुनाफा नेपालमै लगानी गर्ने क्रममा कमी आउँदै छ । संयुक्त लगानीका क्षेत्रमा जुन उत्साह र उमंग देखिँदै थियो, त्यो घट्दै गएको छ । सरकारले निकै चाहे पनि विभिन्न कारणले नेपाल विदेशी लगानीकर्ताका लागि आकर्षक नभएको देखिँदै छ । मुलुकमा स्थिरता, लगानीमैत्री वातावरण तथा कानुनको शासन धेरै महत्त्वपूर्ण पक्ष हो । यसतर्फ धेरै चुनौती थपिँदै गएको सबैले अनुभव गरेकै तथ्य हो ।
यति हुँदाहुँदै पनि केही क्षेत्र नेपालका लागि धेरै महत्त्वपूर्ण छन् । जस्तो, नेपाल विद्युत् प्राधिकरणले यसै आर्थिक वर्षका पहिला तीन महिनामा ८.५ अर्ब रुपैयाँ मुनाफा कमाएको छ । विद्युत् व्यापारमा भएको प्रगतिले यो सम्भव भएको हो । आफ्नो तथा निजी क्षेत्रको विद्युत् खरिद, ब्याज संकलन तथा अन्य आयस्रोतबाट समेत यसले उक्त अवधिमा २२ अर्ब रुपैयाँभन्दा बढी आर्जन गरेको देखिन्छ । उक्त अवधिमा लगानी गरिएको २४.८८ अर्बलाई घटाउँदा यसको मुनाफा उक्त बमोजिम हुन आउँछ । भारततर्फ विद्युत् आपूर्तिबाट मात्र यसले तीन महिनामा ६.१७ अर्ब रुपैयाँ मुनाफा गरेको छ । पोहोर मात्रै पनि यसको वार्षिक मुनाफा १६.१६ अर्ब रुपैयाँ थियो । जबकि सात वर्षअगाडि मात्र प्राधिकरणको वार्षिक घाटा ८.८९ अर्ब रुपैयाँ थियो । जलविद्युत्का क्षेत्रमा नेपालमा समयले कोल्टे फेरेको छ ।
जलविद्युत् क्षेत्रमा असीमित सम्भावनाहरू छन् । पाइपलाइनमा भएका परियोजनाहरूको छिटोछरितो कार्यान्वयनले विदेशी पुँजी आर्जन गर्न धेरै मद्दत पुग्ने देखिन्छ । मुलुकभित्रका स्रोतहरूका आधारमा बनाइएका तथा एफडीआई अन्तर्गतका सबै परियोजनालाई उचित रूपमा प्रोत्साहन गर्ने तथा भ्रष्टाचारमुक्त वातावरणमा काम गर्ने अवसर दिने हो भने यो क्षेत्र धेरै उपलब्धिमूलक हुन सक्छ । खास गरी नेपालको जलविद्युत् भारत, बंगलादेश तथा अन्य मुलुकमा सजिलै प्रवाह गर्न सकिने हो भने अहिलेको लगानीको स्तरलाई अझ वृद्धि गर्न अप्ठ्यारो पर्दैन । यसका लागि सरकारले विद्युत् खरिद सम्झौताहरूलाई सहजीकरण गर्नुपर्छ । भारतको विद्युत् प्रसारण सञ्जालको प्रयोग गर्न सक्ने हो भने नेपाललाई निर्यात बजारको समस्या छँदै छैन । चिनियाँ पक्षले समेत नेपालबाट भोट (तिब्बत) तर्फ पनि विद्युत् आयात गर्न आफू तयार रहेको पुनर्पुष्टि गरेको छ ।
यति राम्रो परिस्थिति भए पनि, नेपालमै दर्ता भई यहीँ लगानी गर्ने एफडीआई अन्तर्गतका परियोजनाहरू यहाँको बेथितिले गर्दा अन्योलमा छन् । भ्रष्टाचार तथा कानुनविहीनताको अनुभव सबैभन्दा पहिले लगानीकर्ताहरूलाई हुन्छ । लगानी गरी मुनाफा कमाउन आएको एफडीआई अदालतको तारिख थामेर बस्नुपर्ने स्थिति हुनु हुँदैन । यस्ता निकायहरू आन्तरिक कानुनी कारबाहीहरूबाट त्रस्त देखिन्छन् । संविधानको धारा २७९ जस्तो सुस्पष्ट संवैधानिक प्रावधान पनि हाल आएर विवादको विषय बन्दै छ । यसले लगानी गर्ने धेरैलाई हतोत्साहित गराइदिन सक्छ ।
संविधानको धारा २७९ मा मूलतः पाँच व्यवस्था समाविष्ट छन् । पहिलो व्यवस्थाले नेपाल राज्य वा नेपाल सरकार पक्ष हुने सन्धि वा सम्झौताको अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृति वा समर्थन संघीय कानुन बमोजिम हुने स्पष्ट गर्छ । यसरी कानुन बनाउँदा शान्ति र मैत्री, सुरक्षा एवम् सामरिक सम्बन्ध, नेपाल राज्यको सिमाना र प्राकृतिक स्रोत तथा त्यसको उपयोगको बाँडफाँटका विषयका सन्धि वा सम्झौताको अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृति वा समर्थन संघीय संसद्का दुवै सदनमा तत्काल कायम रहेको सम्पूर्ण सदस्यसंख्याको दुईतिहाइ बहुमतले गर्नुपर्ने सर्त हुनुपर्ने दोस्रो व्यवस्था छ ।
तर शान्ति र मैत्री तथा प्राकृतिक स्रोत तथा त्यसको उपयोगको बाँडफाँट सम्बन्धी विषयका सन्धि वा सम्झौतामध्ये राष्ट्रलाई व्यापक, गम्भीर र दीर्घकालीन असर नपर्ने साधारण प्रकृतिका सन्धि वा सम्झौताको अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृति वा समर्थन प्रतिनिधिसभाको बैठकमा उपस्थित सदस्यहरूको साधारण बहुमतबाट हुन सक्ने विकल्प पनि संविधानको धारा २७९(२) ले तेस्रो व्यवस्थाका रूपमा उल्लेख गरेको छ । अर्को शब्दमा, उपर्युक्त अवस्थाका सन्धि वा सम्झौता संघीय संसद्का दुवै सदनमा तत्काल कायम रहेका सम्पूर्ण सदस्यसंख्याको दुईतिहाइ बहुमतले पारित गर्नु जरुरी हुँदैन ।
चौथो व्यवस्था अनुसार यो संविधान प्रारम्भ भएपछि हुने कुनै सन्धि वा सम्झौता धारा २७९ बमोजिम अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृति वा समर्थन नभएसम्म नेपाल सरकार वा नेपालको हकमा लागू हुन सक्दैन । यस सम्बन्धी अन्तिम व्यवस्थाले सन्धि वा सम्झौता गर्ने अधिकार नेपालको भौगोलिक अखण्डताको प्रतिकूल असर पर्ने गरी प्रयोग नगरिने उल्लेख गरेको छ । समग्रमा, सन्धि वा सम्झौताको अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृति वा समर्थन सम्बन्धी व्यवस्थाले नेपालको महत्त्वपूर्ण राष्ट्रिय हितका विषयहरू संसद्बाट अनुमोदन होऊन् भन्ने प्रस्ट उद्देश्य राख्छ ।
धारा २७९ का उपर्युक्त प्रावधानहरूले २०४७ सालको नेपाल अधिराज्यको संविधान लागू भएदेखि नै निरन्तरता पाएका छन् । उक्त संविधानको धारा १२६ र यसलाई प्रतिस्थापन गर्ने नेपालको अन्तरिम संविधान–२०६३ को धारा १५६ का व्यवस्थाहरू हुबहु मिल्छन् । यी प्रावधानहरूको मूल उद्देश्य नेपाल राज्य वा नेपाल सरकारले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सन्धि–सम्झौता गर्दा कुनै वैदेशिक मुलुक वा दुईदेशीय वा बहुदेशीय वा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय संघसंस्थाहरूको दबाबमा आफ्ना आधारभूत राष्ट्रिय हितका कुराहरूमा धोका नहोस् भनी सुनिश्चित गर्नु हो । त्यस्ता सन्धि वा सम्झौता संसद् पुगेपछि सदनभित्र तथा बाहिर राष्ट्रिय स्तरमा छलफल हुने अवसर प्राप्त हुन्छ । गर्न नहुने कामकारबाही संसद्बाटै किनारा लगाउन सकिन्छ । यस्तो व्यवस्था नभएकैले नेपाल राज्य वा सरकारले विवश भएर त्यस्ता राष्ट्रिय हितविपरीतका सन्धि वा सम्झौतामा हस्ताक्षर गर्नुपर्ने अवस्था अब रहनेछैन भन्ने सोचाइकै कारण उक्त प्रावधानहरूले निरन्तरता पाएका हुन् ।
स्पष्ट छ, धारा २७९ ले सन्धि वा सम्झौताको कुरा गर्छ । यी दुइटै शब्द वैदेशिक मुलुक वा दुईदेशीय वा बहुदेशीय वा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय संघसंस्थाहरूसँग गरिने सन्धि वा सम्झौतातर्फ लक्षित छन् । यी दुइटैको प्रयोग अन्तरपरिवर्तनीय (इन्टरचेन्जेबल) शब्दका रूपमा गरिएको हो । यो तथ्यलाई विक्रम संवत् २०४७ सालको संविधानको धारा १२६ का सन्दर्भमा आत्मसात् गरेरै २०४७ मंसिर १ मा लागू भएको नेपाल सन्धि ऐनले सन्धि भन्नाले ‘दुई वा दुईभन्दा बढी राज्यहरू वा कुनै राज्य र अन्तरसरकारी संगठनबीच लिखित रूपमा सम्पन्न भएको सम्झौता सम्झनुपर्दछ र सो शब्दले यसै प्रकृतिको जुनसुकै नामकरण गरिएको लिखतसमेतलाई जनाउनेछ’ भनी स्पष्ट गरेको छ ।
नेपाल सन्धि ऐन–२०४७ यही प्रावधानका लागि बनेको हो । सुरुकै अवस्थामा र आज पनि यो ऐनले यही अर्थमा आफ्ना प्रावधानहरू विस्तारित गरेको छ । सन्धि र सम्झौतालाई अलग अर्थमा हेरिएको छैन । यदि सम्झौता भन्ने शब्द मुलुकभित्रका निजी, सार्वजनिक वा आन्तरिक प्रकृतिका संगठन वा एफडीआईका सम्बन्धमा समेत प्रयोग गरिएको भए स्वयं संविधानले या सन्धि ऐनले नै उक्त विषयमा स्पष्ट प्रावधानहरू उल्लेख गर्ने थियो । त्यस्तो झझल्को कतैबाट पनि देखिँदैन ।
त्यसै गरी, यो ऐन पछिल्लो पटक २०७२ फागुन १३ मा केही नेपाल ऐन संशोधन गर्ने ऐनद्वारा संशोधन भएको पाइन्छ । यो अवधिमा कहिल्यै सन्धि वा सम्झौता अलगअलग परिप्रेक्ष्यमा प्रयोग गरिएको भन्ने आशयले न नेपाल सन्धि ऐन संशोधन गरिएको छ, न त नेपाल सरकारको कुनै औपचारिक निर्णय वा व्याख्या नै आएको छ । मूलतः धारा २७९ बमोजिमको सन्धि वा सम्झौता नेपालको अन्य राज्य पक्ष तथा अन्तरसरकारी संगठनबीचको कारोबार नै हो भन्ने व्याख्यामा दुईमत हुने ठाउँ छैन । तथापि, आजकल बरालिने गरी व्याख्या हुन थालेको देखिन्छ ।
प्रचलित व्यवस्था अनुसार प्राकृतिक स्रोतको उपयोग तथा बाँडफाँट सम्बन्धी सन्धि वा सम्झौता संसद्को दुईतिहाइ बहुमतबाट हुनुपर्ने भन्ने व्यवस्था एफडीआई लगायत आन्तरिक रूपमा लगानी गरिएको जलविद्युत् परियोजनाका सम्बन्धमा आकर्षित हुने देखिँदैन । सर्वोच्च अदालतले विगतमा गरेका निर्णयहरूका आधारमा पनि सरकार तथा परियोजना सम्पन्न गर्ने कम्पनीबीचका व्यापारिक सम्झौताहरू यस अन्तर्गत पर्दैनन् । सर्वोच्च अदालतद्वारा २०६४ सालमा पश्चिम सेती परियोजनाविरुद्ध दायर भएको रिट निवेदनमा यस विषयमा व्याख्या भइसकेको देखिन्छ ।
अस्ट्रेलियाली कम्पनी स्मेकसँग नेपाल सरकारले गरेको सम्झौतामा पश्चिम सेती परियोजना निर्माण गरी उत्पादित बिजुली भारत निर्यात गर्ने सम्झौता यस निवेदनको मूल विषयवस्तु थियो । एकले अर्कालाई दिएको व्यापारिक वा व्यावसायिक प्रतिफल देखिएकाले त्यसलाई दुई देशबीच प्राकृतिक स्रोतको बाँडफाँटका रूपमा अर्थ्याउन मिल्ने देखिन्न । अनि निश्चित समयका लागि मात्रै आयोजना सञ्चालन अनुमति कम्पनीलाई दिइएको देखिँदा उक्त अवधि व्यतीत भएपछि आयोजना र सम्पूर्ण सञ्चालन प्रणाली नै नेपाल सरकारमा फिर्ता आउने हुनाले त्यसलाई सही अर्थमा प्राकृतिक स्रोतको बाँडफाँट भन्न नमिल्ने नजिर स्थापित छ ।
उक्त फैसलाका विषयवस्तुको अतिरिक्त व्याख्या गर्नु जरुरी छैन । तथापि, अन्तरिम संविधानको सन्धि–सम्झौता अनुमोदनको प्रावधानमा टेकेर एउटा जलविद्युत् परियोजनाका सम्बन्धमा गोरखबहादुर बीसी र माधवकुमार बस्नेतद्वारा २०६४ सालमा छुट्टाछुट्टै दुइटा रिट सर्वोच्च अदालतमा प्रस्तुत भएको देखिन्छ । जहाँसम्म गोरखबहादुर बीसीसमेतको रिट निवेदनको फैसला छ, यसमा सर्वोच्च अदालतको संयुक्त इजलासले कुनै पनि उत्पादित चीज, वस्तु वा सेवाजस्तै विद्युत्को व्यापार हुन सक्ने र सो निर्यात पनि गर्न सकिने तथा कानुनले यस्तो कार्य गर्न निषेध गरेकामा बाहेक सो गर्न नपाउने भन्न नमिल्ने तथ्य पुनर्पुष्टि गरेको छ । त्यसै गरी माधवकुमार बस्नेतसमेतको रिटमा अर्को विशेष इजलासले गरेको फैसलामा विद्युत् स्वयंमा प्राकृतिक स्रोत नभर्ई प्राकृतिक स्रोत पानीबाट उत्पादन हुने भएकाले अरूसरह यो व्यापारयोग्य र निर्यातयोग्य वस्तु पनि हो भन्ने सन्दर्भमा अदालतलाई अलमल छैन ।
प्रस्तुत जलविद्युत् आयोजना सम्बन्धमा दुई देशबीच वा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय अन्तरसरकारी संगठनबीच प्राकृतिक स्रोतसाधनको बाँडफाँट सम्बन्धी सम्झौता नभई प्राकृतिक स्रोतका रूपमा रहेको पानी प्रयोग गरी उत्पादित विद्युत्लाई मात्र व्यापारिक सम्झौताबाट व्यवस्थापन गर्न निश्चित सर्तहरूसहित खास अवधिका लागि अनुमतिसम्म दिइएको हुँदा बाँडफाँट गरेको भन्न नमिल्ने भन्ने उक्त संयुक्त इजलासको स्पष्ट दृष्टिकोण छ । यस फैसलामा विद्युत् स्वयंमा प्राकृतिक स्रोत नभई प्राकृतिक स्रोतबाट उत्पादित वस्तु भएकाले यसको उत्पादन र व्यवस्थापन गर्न राज्यले नीतिगत निर्णय गर्न सक्छ । नेपाल सरकारका यस्ता नीतिगत निर्णयहरूमा सर्वोच्च अदालतले हस्तक्षेप नगर्ने भन्ने नियम स्वतः स्थापित छ ।
करिब १३ वर्षअगाडि नै उपर्युक्त रिट निवेदनहरूमा सर्वोच्च अदालतबाट फैसला भई प्राकृतिक स्रोतको उपयोग तथा बाँडफाँट भन्ने संवैधानिक व्यवस्थाको व्याख्यामा स्पष्टता आइसकेको छ । नजरका रूपमा उक्त फैसलाहरू अझै कायमै छन् । विद्यमान स्पष्ट व्यवस्थाहरूको कार्यान्वयनबाट मात्र लगानीकर्तालाई लगानीको वातावरण र मुलुकलाई प्रतिफल प्राप्त हुने अवस्था सुनिश्चित गर्न सकिन्छ । संविधानको धारा २७९ र नेपाल सन्धि ऐन–२०४७ ले स्पष्ट व्यवस्था गरेका विषयबाहेकका लगानी सम्बन्धी हरेक दस्तावेज संसद् लैजानुपर्ने खण्ड आएमा निश्चित रूपमा यहाँ वैदेशिक निर्यातका लागि जलविद्युत् क्षेत्रमा लगानी गर्न आकर्षण बाँकी रहनेछैन ।
[प्रकाशित : फाल्गुन १४, २०७९ ०७:११]

राष्ट्रपतिलाई ‘सेरेमोनियल’ भनेर मानमर्दन गर्न हुँदैन। राष्ट्रपतिको क्षमता संवैधानिक हो। उसलाई शक्तिहीन ठान्नु गलत बुझाइ हो।
नेपालमा राष्ट्रपति पदको प्रयोग भएको धेरै भएको छैन। हामीले दुई वटा राष्ट्रपति मात्रै अनुभव गर्यौं। यद्यपि, वर्तमान संविधानले राष्ट्रपतिलाई जुन स्थानमा राखेको छ, त्यही स्थानमा हिजो २०४७ सालको संविधानले राजालाई राखेको थियो। आधारभूत रूपमा यी दुईबीच धेरै फरक छैन।
वर्तमान संविधानले राष्ट्रपतिलाई तीन रूपमा प्रस्तुत गरेको छः राष्ट्राध्यक्ष, राष्ट्रिय एकताको प्रवर्द्धक र संविधानको संरक्षक एवं पालक। संवैधानिक राजाको पनि यी तीन कर्तव्य थिए। फरक कति मात्र हो भने, राजा वंशीय हुन्थे, राष्ट्रपति जननिर्वाचित। संवैधानिक राजालाई कुनै राजनीतिक दलसँग जोडेर हेर्न मिल्दैनथ्यो। राष्ट्रपति सामान्यतया कुनै दलबाटै प्रस्तावित हुन्छन् र कम-बेसी राजनीतिक पृष्ठभूमि हुन्छ।
राष्ट्रपतिका काम संविधान निर्देशित हुन्छन्। संवैधानिक रूपमा स्पष्ट नभएको अवस्थामा संघीय कानून बमोजिम गर्नुपर्छ। हाम्रो संविधानले निश्चित अवस्थामा निश्चित संवैधानिक अङ्गको सिफारिश अनुसार गर्ने भनेको बाहेक अन्य अवस्थामा मन्त्रिपरिषद्को सिफारिशमा राष्ट्रपतिले कार्य गर्ने भनेर तोकेको छ। जस्तै- प्रधानन्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति गर्दा संवैधानिक परिषद्को सिफारिशमा गर्नुपर्छ। त्यस्तो अवस्थामा बाहेक राष्ट्रपतिले मन्त्रिपरिषद्को सिफारिश वा सम्मतिमा काम गर्नुपर्छ।
राष्ट्रपतिले आफैं अघि सरेर केही गर्ने चाहना राखेमा प्रधानमन्त्रीको सम्मति पाउनुपर्छ। सिफारिश र सम्मति दुवै प्रधानमन्त्री मार्फत राष्ट्रपति समक्ष पेश हुन्छ। त्यसको अर्थ हो, प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई पन्छाएर राष्ट्रपतिले अरू कसैबाट सिफारिश लिन हुँदैन। प्रधानमन्त्रीले दिएको सम्मति मन्त्रिपरिषद्कै सम्मति हो। त्यो सम्मति छ भने नेपाल सरकार राष्ट्रपतिको उक्त कदममा जवाफदेही हुन्छ।
संवैधानिक दायरा
संविधानको पालना, संरक्षण र प्रवर्द्धन गर्ने नाममा राष्ट्रपतिले मन्त्रिपरिषद्को सिफारिश वा सम्मति विना जे गरे पनि असंवैधानिक हुन्छ। संसदीय प्रणालीमा राष्ट्रपतिले शक्ति सन्तुलनलाई असर पार्ने गरी काम गर्न हुँदैन। हाम्रो संविधानको परिकल्पना ‘गल्ती नगर्ने राष्ट्रपति’ हो। राष्ट्रपतिले संसद्, संवैधानिक अङ्ग र मन्त्रिपरिषद्को निर्णय तथा सिफारिश अनुसार गर्ने र हरेक निर्णयको जवाफदेही सिफारिश गर्नेले नै लिनुपर्ने भएकाले गल्ती गर्दैनन् भनिएको हो। कुनै कानूनको जिम्मेवारी त्यो पारित गर्ने संसद्ले, नीति तथा कार्यक्रमको जिम्मेवारी सरकारले र अन्य निर्णयहरू सिफारिश गर्ने संवैधानिक अङ्गले लिनुपर्छ।
यसको अर्थ राष्ट्रपतिले आफ्नो दृष्टिकोण राख्नै पाउँदैन, प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई केही भन्नै पाउँदैन भन्ने पनि होइन। संसदीय व्यवस्थामा चाहे राजा हुन् वा राष्ट्रपति, राष्ट्राध्यक्षका रूपमा प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई सल्लाह दिन सक्छन्। के गर्न हुन्छ, हुँदैन भन्नेबारे आफ्नो दृष्टिकोण राख्न सक्छन्। सचेत बनाउन सक्छन्, प्रोत्साहन पनि दिन सक्छन्। तर, यी कुनै पनि अभ्यास सार्वजनिक रूपमा व्यक्त गरिँदैन। बेलायती संविधानविद्हरू ए.भी. डायसी, वाल्टर बेगहर्ट र आइभर जेन्निङ्ग्सले यही मान्यतालाई धेरै महत्त्व दिएका छन्। राष्ट्रप्रमुख र सरकारप्रमुखबीचको सम्बन्धलाई यी दुईमध्ये कसैले पनि राजनीतिक पूँजी आर्जनका लागि खर्च गर्न हुँदैन।
संवैधानिक शास्त्र यस्तो भए पनि अभ्यासका क्रममा भने केही कमीकमजोरी देखिएका छन्। हामीले अनुभव गरेका दुवै राष्ट्रपतिको भूमिका संवैधानिक हिसाबले समग्रमा ठीकै थियो, तर दुवै विवादमा आउनुभयो। पहिलो राष्ट्रपतिले तत्कालीन प्रधानसेनापति रुकमाङ्गद कटवाललाई बर्खास्त गर्ने प्रधानमन्त्रीको निर्णयमा हस्तक्षेप गर्नुभयो। त्यसबाट प्रधानमन्त्रीको अधिकार प्रभावित हुन पुग्यो। त्यस्तै, दोस्रो राष्ट्रपति पनि नागरिकता प्रकरणमा विवादित हुनुभयो।
त्यसो त उहाँले सन्देश सहित नागरिकता विधेयक फिर्ता पठाएपछि त्यसबारे सरकारले संसद्मा गम्भीर छलफल गराउनुपर्थ्यो। जस्ताको तस्तै पारित गरेर सरकारले दम्भ देखायो। राष्ट्रपतिको भूमिका त्यस्तै अवस्थामा आवश्यक हुन्छ, जुन तत्कालीन सरकारले बुझेन। तर, संसद्ले पारित गरेको विधेयक प्रमाणीकरण नगरी खेर जान दिने अधिकार राष्ट्रपतिसँग थिएन। त्यो असंवैधानिक कदम थियो।
राष्ट्रपति पदको अभ्यासमा देखिएको अर्को समस्या विश्वासको सङ्कट हो। दुवै राष्ट्रपतिलाई उहाँहरू त्यसअघि आबद्ध दल र त्यसका नेताहरूसँगको सम्बन्धबारे टिप्पणी गरियो। पहिलोमा भन्दा दोस्रो राष्ट्रपतिको अभ्यासमा धेरै अविश्वास देखियो। यसमा भने प्रधानमन्त्री जिम्मेवार हुनुपर्छ। संसदीय व्यवस्थाको साँचो प्रधानमन्त्रीको हातमा हुन्छ।
सरकारका निर्णयमाथि प्रश्न उठेमा संसद्, मन्त्रिपरिषद् र जनता सबैको सामना गर्ने प्रधानमन्त्रीले नै हो। संसदीय व्यवस्थामा राष्ट्रपतिको भूमिका जति असन्तोषपूर्ण हुन्छ, त्यति नै प्रधानमन्त्री कमजोर मानिन्छ। त्यसैले राष्ट्रपति संस्थालाई मर्यादित बनाउने जिम्मेवारी पनि प्रधानमन्त्रीको हो। राष्ट्रपतिका विचारलाई प्रधानमन्त्रीले नै अभिव्यक्ति दिने हो। त्यसमा राष्ट्रपतिले पनि सघाउनुपर्छ।
विश्वकै उदाहरण हेरौं। राष्ट्राध्यक्षहरूको भूमिकाका कारण बेलायतको संसदीय व्यवस्था उदाहरणीय भएको हो। हालै स्वर्गीय भएकी महारानी एलिजाबेथ द्वितीय, उनका बुबा जर्ज छैटौं, उनकी जिजु हजुरआमा क्विन भिक्टोरियाले प्रधानमन्त्रीको अधिकारमाथि कहिल्यै हस्तक्षेप गरेनन्। उनीहरूले प्रधानमन्त्रीसँग फरक मत भए पनि सार्वजनिक नगर्ने र उनकै सिफारिशमा काम गर्ने मान्यता स्थापित गरे।
भारतमै पनि पहिलो राष्ट्रपति राजेन्द्रप्रसाद र प्रधानमन्त्री जवाहरलाल नेहरूको बीचमा को शक्तिशाली भन्नेबारे संघर्ष भएको थियो। नेहरूले कुशलतापूर्वक त्यसको समाधान गरे। उनले जनमत पाएर गरिने शासन र राष्ट्रपतिले खेल्ने भूमिकामा अन्तर छ भन्नेमा राजेन्द्रप्रसादलाई अन्ततः सहमत गराए। सर्वपल्ली राधाकृष्णन र रामाश्वामी वेंकटरमण जस्ता राष्ट्रपति निकै प्रभावशाली मानिन्थे। तर, उनीहरूले प्रधानमन्त्रीको अधिकारमाथि कहिल्यै हस्तक्षेप गरेनन्। उनीहरूका रायलाई प्रधानमन्त्रीले सधैं गम्भीरतापूर्वक लिए।
हाम्रोमा पनि यस्तो परम्परा स्थापित हुन जरुरी छ। प्रधानमन्त्री र राष्ट्रपतिबीच दूरी हुनु हुँदैन। राष्ट्रपति र प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई भिन्दाभिन्दै टीमको रूपमा बुझिएको छ। त्यही बुझाइका कारण अहिले राष्ट्रपति पदका लागि तँछाडमछाड भइरहेछ। त्यो प्रतिस्पर्धाका पछाडि राष्ट्रपति पदको दुरुपयोग गर्ने उद्देश्य देखिन्छ।
बुझ्न जरुरी छ, राष्ट्रपतिको सबैभन्दा विश्वसनीय, सक्षम सल्लाहकार प्रधानमन्त्री नै हो। यसको अर्थ राष्ट्रपतिले अरू सल्लाहकार नै राख्न हुँदैन, अरूसँग सरसल्लाह गर्नै हुँदैन भन्ने होइन। राष्ट्रपतिको प्रोटोकल विभिन्न रूपमा प्रयोग हुन्छ, उनलाई पनि विभिन्न सल्लाहकार चाहिन्छ, तर राजनीतिक सल्लाहकार प्रधानमन्त्री नै हो। अरू पक्षबाट दिइएको सल्लाहका आधारमा शासनमा हस्तक्षेप गर्नु हुँदैन। राष्ट्रपतिले बोल्दा त्यसमा प्रधानमन्त्रीको छवि आउनुपर्छ, तब मात्रै संसदीय प्रणाली सफल हुन्छ।
हाम्रोमा हुन नसकेको अभ्यास राष्ट्रपति र प्रधानमन्त्रीबीचको नियमित भेटघाट हो। संवैधानिक राजतन्त्र हुँदा हरेक साता प्रधानमन्त्रीले राजालाई ब्रिफिङ गर्ने चलन थियो। पुष्पकमल दाहाल पहिलो पटक प्रधानमन्त्री भएदेखि राष्ट्रपतिलाई नियमित ब्रिफिङ गर्ने अभ्यास नै हट्यो। यस सम्बन्धमा प्रथम राष्ट्रपतिको ठूलो गुनासो थियो, ‘मलाई राजकाजबारे जानकारी गराइएन’ भनेर।
वर्तमान राष्ट्रपतिले पनि प्रधानमन्त्रीहरूले नियमित रूपमा छलफल नगरेको आशय व्यक्त गर्नुभएको छ। त्यस्तो नियमित भेटघाट आवश्यक छ। तर, त्यस्तो छलफलबारे सार्वजनिक वृत्तमा टीकाटिप्पणी हुनु हुँदैन। राष्ट्रपति र प्रधानमन्त्रीबीचको समझदारी वा असमझदारी उनीहरूबीच गोप्य रहनुपर्छ।
अभ्यासका क्रममा देखापरेको अर्को समस्या हो, हामीले राष्ट्रपति संस्थाको मर्यादा कायम राख्न सकेका छैनौं। मन्त्री र सांसदले नै राष्ट्रपतिलाई व्यक्तिगत रूपमा टीकाटिप्पणी गरेको पाइन्छ। आफूहरू हुल बाँधेर भेट्न जाने तर अर्को समूह भेट्न जाँदा निम्न स्तरको टिप्पणी गर्ने अभ्यास समेत भयो। त्यसले संस्थाको गरिमा खस्काउँछ। राष्ट्रपति हामीबाटै निर्वाचित भएको हो भन्ने बिर्सनु हुँदैन।
राजनीतिक व्यक्तित्वले राष्ट्रको सर्वोच्च संस्थालाई कसरी सम्मान गर्नुपर्छ भन्नेबारे बीपी कोइरालाबाट सिक्न सकिन्छ। राजा महेन्द्रले जननिर्वाचित सरकार नै अपदस्थ गरेर बीपीलाई आठ वर्ष थुने। त्यसै क्रममा नेपाली कांग्रेसले राजाको कदम विरुद्ध आन्दोलनको आह्वान गर्यो। तर, बीपीले राजाबारे बोल्दा कहिले पनि अशिष्ट शब्द प्रयोग गरेनन्। एकअर्काप्रति अमर्यादित टीकाटिप्पणी र निम्न स्तरको व्यवहारले व्यवस्थाप्रति नै निराशा पैदा हुन्छ। नेपालमा अहिले त्यस्तै प्रवृत्ति देखिन्छ।
पदीय गरिमाको प्रश्न
राष्ट्रपति पदको गरिमा र मर्यादा कायम राखिरहन त्यो पदमा कस्तो व्यक्तिलाई आसीन गराइन्छ भन्नेले पनि ठूलो भूमिका खेल्छ। राष्ट्रपतिलाई ‘सेरेमोनियल’ भनेर मानमर्दन गर्न हुँदैन। राष्ट्रपतिको क्षमता संवैधानिक हो। उसलाई शक्तिहीन ठान्नु गलत बुझाइ हो। शक्ति त निकै नरम अवधारणा हो। सर्वमान्य, विवादरहित, सक्षम र देशप्रति बफादार व्यक्ति राष्ट्रपति हुँदा उसको नरम शक्ति जहिले पनि औपचारिक शक्तिभन्दा धेरै गुणा बढी हुन सक्छ। उसका दृष्टिकोणले देशलाई बलियो संगठनमा रूपान्तरण गर्न सक्छन्।
हाम्रो संविधानले राष्ट्रपतिलाई संविधानको संरक्षकसँगै राष्ट्रिय एकताको प्रवर्द्धक पनि मानेको छ। त्यो पदमा अहिलेसम्म वञ्चितीकरणमा परेका आदिवासी जनजाति, मधेशी, महिला, दलित तथा अल्पसंख्यक लगायत समुदायबाट सक्षम र स्थापित व्यक्तित्वलाई पुर्याउन सके राष्ट्रिय एकताको प्रवर्द्धन हुन्छ। अहिले चर्चा भइरहे जस्तो पूर्व प्रधानमन्त्री, राजनीतिक नेतालाई राष्ट्रपति बनाउँदा त्यस्तो नहुने सम्भावना हुन्छ। विवादित पृष्ठभूमिबाट आएको मानिस राष्ट्रपति हुँदा विभाजन सिर्जना हुन्छ। त्योभन्दा गैरदलीय पृष्ठभूमिका व्यक्ति उचित हुन्। भारतको उदाहरण हेर्दा वैज्ञानिक, समाजसेवी, अल्पसंख्यक, महिलालाई यो गरिमा दिइएको छ।
विडम्बना, हामीकहाँ राष्ट्रपति भइसकेको मानिसले दलीय राजनीतिमा फर्कने मनसाय राखेको पनि सुनिन्छ। राष्ट्रपति त देशकै सर्वोच्च पद हो। त्यो पदमा पुगिसकेको मानिस दलीय राजनीतिमा आउनु अशोभनीय हुन्छ। त्यसले राष्ट्रपति संस्थालाई मर्यादित बनाउँदैन। एक पटक राष्ट्रपति भइसकेको मानिस सधैंका लागि पूजनीय भएर बस्नुपर्छ।
राष्ट्रपति पदको निर्वाचन नजिकिँदै गर्दा विदेशी र स्थायी शक्तिहरू सक्रिय रहेको समाचार पनि आइरहेका छन्। शक्ति दुरुपयोग गर्न चाहनेले आफू अनुकूल राष्ट्रपति होस् भनेर चलखेल थालेको देखिन्छ। हाम्रा राष्ट्रपतिले विदेशी राजदूतहरूलाई भेट्दा स्पष्ट रूपमा आफू संवैधानिक राष्ट्रपति भएको अवगत गराउनुपर्छ। मानिसहरूले आआफ्ना चाहना राख्न सक्छन्, तर क्षमतावान् राष्ट्रपतिले तिनलाई प्रधानमन्त्रीतिरै पठाउने हो।
आशा गरौं, संविधानले परिकल्पना गरे अनुसार कर्तव्य पूरा गर्ने, सक्षम र विवादरहित व्यक्तिलाई हामीले तेस्रो राष्ट्रपतिका रूपमा सम्मान गर्ने अवसर पाउनेछौं। र, उक्त पदलाई मर्यादित बनाउन राजनीतिक दल एवम् हरेक प्रधानमन्त्रीले भूमिका खेल्नेछन्।
(संवैधानिक कानून विज्ञ अधिकारीसँगको कुराकानीमा आधारित। हिमालको २०७९ फागुन अंकबाट।)

This is the first book in Nepal that provides a critical analysis of the constitutional bodies created by the Constitution of Nepal in 2015. The book is published by Niti Foundation, a non-governmental organization dedicated to the cause of public policy in the country.
[pdf-embedder url=”https://bipinadhikari.com.np/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/BOOK_Constitutional-Bodies-in-Nepal.pdf” title=”BOOK_Constitutional Bodies in Nepal”]
While the country was celebrating Constitution Day earlier this week, political parties submitted their closed list of the proportional representation candidates for the November elections of the House of Representatives and provincial assemblies to the Election Commission Nepal.
The goal behind the implementation of the proportional representation electoral system was to reduce the long-standing inequality based on regions, communities, genders, classes, etc, and to guarantee inclusive representation in the legislature. But, looking at the list, it can be said that the parties have prioritised the leaders who already have political access to resources.
In other words, the parties that competed to express commitment to implement the constitution ironically did the opposite and prepared a non-inclusive list. Hence, serious questions have once again been raised about the commitment and honesty of the parties towards the constitution.
“The political leadership should have thought about the spirit and intention of the proportional representation electoral system. But, if they just want to exploit the loopholes and serve those who are members of parliaments and ministers in the proportional representation quota, we can just follow one system (first-past-the-post or proportional),” comments Bipin Adhikari, a senior constitutional expert and policy analyst.
Adhikari adds that the leaders of major parties that have contested direct elections and keep losing are misusing the proportional representation system.
Capture by the powerful
Political parties have included names of powerful leaders on their lists of proportional representation candidates for the 2022 elections.
The CPN-Maoist Centre, which claims to have proportional inclusion as its agenda, has prioritised Krishna Bahadur Mahara who already has won multiple elections and enjoys parliamentary and political benefits. He won elections from Rolpa-2 in 1991, Dang-3 in 2007, Rolpa-1 in 2013 and Dang-2 in 2017.
The party championed Mahara even though he had to resign as the speaker after facing allegations of sexual violence. Mahara is also currently the vice-chairperson of the Maoist Centre.
He says. “I fought directly five times and won, so I asked them to put me in the proportional representation system this time.”
Nepali Congress shares the same case. From Gopal Man Shrestha, who has been the acting chief (of the Nepali Congress Democratic party) to Bimalendra Nidhi, who has claimed the leadership of the party, are also giving their candidacy under the proportional representation system. Nidhi, who carries the family legacy of Congress founder Mahendra Narayan Nidhi, won the 2008 elections from Dhanusha.
Congress joint general secretaries Jeevan Pariyar and Farmullah Mansur are also on the proportional representation candidacy list. Both are leaders in national politics.
What more? They have also kept Arzu Rana Deuba, who might be the successor of the party leadership, on the list. Deuba, who contested in the 2017 election from Kailali-5, was still recommended from the same constituency.
Another strong example of that is Prem Bahadur Singh. Singh, who entered the UML last March by sharing the same platform together with actress Karishma Manandhar, is also on the list. Singh had already formed a separate party and became MP and won elections under the proportional representation system in 2007 and 2013.
Nainkala Thapa is another name on the UML’s list. On June 10 last year, UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli appointed Thapa as the minister for communications (though only for two weeks) whereas she is the wife of UML Vice-Chairman Ram Bahadur Thapa.
CPN-Unified Socialist has also placed its leaders, who have a stronghold, on the proportional representation candidate list. Vice-chairman Pramesh Hamal, deputy general secretary Gangalal Tuladhar and secretary Nagendra Chaudhary are on the list. All these three are leaders who have good influence within the party and even in national politics.
This trend of listing political leaders, who can and have won direct elections, in the proportional representation candidate list started with Girija Prasad Koirala. In the 2007 elections, the then Prime Minister and Nepali Congress President Koirala sat at the top of the list. Given Koirala’s age or seniority and previous roles (interim prime minister and head of state), no one from the party opposed it either.
Meanwhile, protests broke out because the parties started including rich people with controversial backgrounds on the proportional representation candidate list. But, the parties did not make any corrections and the trend continued.
Parties have assigned ministerial and advisory responsibilities to rich and influential leaders who came with the benefit of the proportional representation electoral system.
Constitutional expert Bipin Adhikari says the system adopted by the parties now does not allow the participation of marginalised communities, castes, genders and regions, going against the purpose of the system altogether.
A suitable example of this is the current Home Minister Bal Krishna Khand. Khand has been a central member of Congress since 1996 and a strong contender for the leadership of the party. But, he too used the quota to get into the parliament in 2017.
The trend also shows that those without political background or merit have become ministers through the proportional representation system.
Moti Lal Dugar, who held the position of special economic advisor to Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, became an MP from the proportional representation in the 2017 elections. Not only did Oli make him the MP from the Madheshi cluster but he also appointed him as the state minister for industry.
Earlier, in 2007, the UML also made billionaire Binod Chaudhary a member of parliament under the proportional representation system. It was the same case with Lharkyal Lama. Lama even became the state minister for finance when Jhala Nath Khanal was the prime minister. But, Chaudhary and Lama did not stay long in the UML.
Although the leaders speak in favour of the trend of appointing people from the business background, the perception of it has always been negative. It is a popular thought that they have “bought their way to party and parliament”.
This trend is still in order in the current government. Prime Minister Deuba drew heavy criticism when he appointed Umesh Shrestha, a member of parliament under the proportional representation system, as the state minister for health in July last year.
This story was translated from the original Nepali version and edited for clarity and length.