नेपाल प्रति कटिवद्ध एउटा सामान्य नागरिकका रुपमा आउँदो आर्थिक वर्ष २०७५/७६ को बजेटका सम्बन्धमा नेपालको अर्थ व्यवस्थाका केहि सामान्य सरोकारहरू निम्न बमोजिम अनुरोध गर्दछु:
कृषि, पशुपालन र पर्यटन क्षेत्रलाई पहिलो रास्ट्रीय प्राथमिकताका रुपमा स्थापना गर्ने
१.नेपालको श्रम बजारको अधिकांश जनशक्तिलाई स्थानीय रुपमा स्थानीय क्षेत्रमै काममा लगाउन वा रोजगार प्रदान गर्न कृषि, पशुपालन एवम् पर्यटन क्षेत्रको विकास बाहेक अर्को कुनै विकल्प छैन । यस क्षेत्रमा सम्भावनाहरु देखापर्ने वितिक्कै विकासका अन्य आधार एवं प्रक्रियाहरु क्रमश: खुल्दै जाने हुन्छ । मुलुकमा सडक, रेलवे, एयरपोर्ट, विद्युत, आम–संञ्चार इत्यादि भौतिक पुर्वाधारको क्षेत्रमा निरन्तर लगानी आवश्यक छ । तर पूर्वाधारको लगानीले प्रशस्त खर्च गराएपनि तत्कालै ठूूलो परिणाममा रोजगार नदिन सक्छ । तर कृषि, पशुपालन र पर्यटन क्षेत्रमा त्यस्ता ठूला पूर्वाधार क्षेत्रभन्दा चांडो, तत्काल सुधार गर्न सकिन्छ । यो क्षेत्रले बाहेक कुनै पनि क्षेत्रले तत्कालै स्थानीय नेपालीलाई रोजगारको अवसर दिन सक्दैन । स्थानीय जनतालाई आफ्नो गाउाघरमै टिकाउनका लागि पनि यो क्षेत्रको विकास जरुरी छ । गत लामो अवधि देखि सम्पूर्ण कृषि, पर्यटन तथा यसमा आश्रित क्षेत्रहरु प्रति विगतका सरकारहरुले प्रशस्त अन्याय गरेका छन् । यसतर्फ सुधार देखिनु पर्दछ । समुन्नत नेपाल निर्माणका प्रयासको प्रस्थान विन्दु कुषि, पशुपालन र पर्यटन क्षेत्र नै हो । यस क्षेत्रमा पुनर्जागरण आवश्यक छ I
२. नेपालको कृषि क्षेत्रको यथोचित विकास नहुनु पछाडिको मुख्य कारण वर्तमान अनियन्त्रित एवं अनुत्तरदायी आयात व्यवस्था हो I यहि आयातका कारण नेपाली किसानहरुले कृषिमा टिक्न सक्ने सम्भावना देखेका छैनन् I नेपालमा उत्पादन हुने वा हुनसक्ने वा वैकल्पिक सम्भावना भएका सबै प्रकारका कृषिजन्य आयातहरु बन्द गरिनु पर्दछ I नेपालि युवा किसानहरुलाई वैदेशिक श्रम बाट कृषितर्फा फर्काउनु अहिलेको ठुलो चुनौती हो I
राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरणको स्थापना गर्ने
३. संघीयकरणको वर्तमान सन्दर्भ एवं व्यापक रुपमा हुन गइरहेको राष्ट्रिय एवम अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय लगानीको परिप्रेक्षमा नेपालको संविधान, २०७२ ले कायम गरेको संघीयताको मूल्यमान्यता बमोजिम पर्यावरण सन्तुलन समेतका उद्येश्यले राष्ट्रिय रुपमा बृक्षारोपणलाई पर्याप्त महत्व दिदै वन क्षेत्रका केही महत्वपूर्ण विषयहरुमा जिम्मेवारी बहन गर्न एउटा राष्ट्रिय निकायको अविलम्ब व्यवस्था गर्नुपर्ने अवस्था छ ।
४. बढ्दो वन विनाश समग्र नेपालको एउटा समस्या हो । नेपाल सरकारले विविध कारणले नेपालको भूभागको कम्तिमा ४० प्रतिशत भुभागमा वन–जंगल कायम राख्ने नीतिको घोषणा गरेको छ । वन–जंगल विनाश हुनु पछाडि दुई प्रमुख कारणहरु छन् । पहिलो कारण वन–जंगलमा आम नेपालीको निर्भरता निरन्तर कायमै छ्र । यसमा जनसंख्याको निरन्तर चाप रही रहनु अर्को कारण हो । वन क्षेत्रको अतिक्रमण तथा वन पैदावारका लागि हुने प्रतिस्पर्धा निरन्तर बढ्दै रहेको समस्या हो । वन विनाशको अर्को कारण मुलुकको पूर्वाधार विकासको आवश्यकता पूरा गर्न वन क्षेत्रको फडानी गर्दै निर्माण कम्पनीहरुलाई जग्गाजमिन उपलब्ध गराउनु पर्ने बाध्यता पनि हो । वन आवरणलाई अहिलेको वर्तमान स्तरमा कायम राखिराख्न एकातर्फ वन क्षेत्रलाई निरन्तर जोगाउनु पर्ने भएको छ भने अर्कोतर्फ विकासका लागि मासिए बमोजिमको वन क्षेत्र पुन: सिर्जना गर्न वृक्षारोपण गर्ने कार्यलाई बलियो सांगठनिक ढाँचा गन्तर्गत ल्याउनु पर्ने तथा यो कार्यमा विशिष्ट व्यवसायिक क्षमता सम्पन्न निकायका रुपमा आधुनिक मापदण्डहरुको प्रयोग गर्नु पनि त्यत्तिकै आवश्यक छ । यसका लागि एउटा नयां संघीय ऐन बनाई राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरणको स्थापना जरुरी भएको छ । यस्तो प्राधिकरणले प्रदेशहरुको व्यवस्थापनमा वन जंगल विकासको बलियो आधार सिर्जना गर्न सक्छ ।
५. नेपालको कृषि, पशुपालन तथा पर्यटन क्षेत्रको दिगो विकासका लागि वनजंगल को विद्यमानता आज पनि त्यतिक्कै महत्वपुर्ण विषय हो I कतिपय नेपाली भू-क्षेत्रको वन-जंगल बाहेक अर्को प्रयोग हुन सक्दैन I त्यस्तै उच्च हिमाली क्षेत्रको पर्यटन प्रणाली त्यहाँको पर्यावरण प्रणालीको निरन्तरतामा भर पर्दछ I
उर्जा संकट समाधान
६. उर्जा संकट समाधान सम्बन्धी नेपाल सरकारको नीतिको कार्यान्वयन वा तदारुकतामा कमी आउनु हुदैन । रास्ट्रीय उर्जा सुरक्षाका लागि विद्यमान नीति पर्याप्त छ I यसलाई ओझेलमा पार्नु भएन I
७. बुढी गण्डकी जल विद्युतको निर्माण तथा सार्वजनिक यातायातलाई विद्युत प्रणालीमा रुपान्तरणको कार्यलाई तत्काल सुरु गर्नु पर्दछ ।
८. चीनतर्फ़बाट ल्याइने पेट्रोलियम पाईप् लाइन का लागि बजेट छुट्याउनु जरुरि छ I यो रास्ट्रीय सुरक्षाको विषय हो I
विद्युत नियमन आयोगको स्थापना र विकास
९.जल विद्युत क्षेत्रको लगानी प्राथमिकता भए पनि नियमनकारी संस्था कमजोर अवस्थामा रहेको सर्वविदितै छ । विद्युत उत्पादन, प्रसारण, वितरण वा व्यापारलाई सरल, नियमित, व्यवस्थित तथा पारदर्शी बनाई विद्युतको माग र आपूर्तिमा सन्तुलन कायम राख्न, विद्युत महसुल नियमन गर्न, विद्युत उपभोक्ताको हक र हित संरक्षण गर्न, विद्युतको बजारलाई प्रतिस्पर्धात्मक बनाउन तथा विद्युत सेवालाई भरपर्दो, सर्वसुलभ, गुणस्तरयुक्त तथा सुरक्षित बनाउन विद्युत नियमन आयोगको व्यवस्था गर्न वाञ्छनीय भएकोले सरकारले विद्युत नियमन आयोग ऐन पारित गराइसकेको छ । नयाा बजेटले विद्युत नियमन आयोगको सांगठनिक विकास तथा क्षमता अभिबृद्धिका लागि बलियो आर्थिक आधार दिनुपर्नेछ ।
शेयर बजार
१०. नेपाल आन्तरिक पूँजी नभएको मुलुक होइन । मुलुकभित्र छरिएर रहेको राष्ट्रिय पूँजीलाई उद्योग वाणिज्य क्षेत्रमा व्यापक रुपमा परिचालन गर्न नसकिएको भने यथार्थ हो । यस उद्येश्यकालागि शेयर बजार आजसम्म पनि सक्षम भइनसकेको परिप्रेक्षमा यसको कानुन व्यवस्थामा व्यापक सुधार गर्ने तथा नेपाल सेक्युरिटी बोर्ड (सेबोन) लाई सांगठनिक रुपमा अझ बलियो बनाउने तर्फ सरकार उद्यत हुनुपर्ने आवश्यकता छ । नेपालमा भौतिक पुर्वाधारका लागि जुन स्तरको लगानीको कुरा गरिदैछ, त्यो स्तरको लगानीको परिचालनको लागि राज्यले शेयरबजार तथा यस क्षेत्रमा संगठनहरुको पुर्वाधार एवं क्षमता अभिबृद्धिमा चाासो राख्न सक्नु पर्दछ । शेयर बजारको सुशाशन समग्र उद्योग, वाणिज्य एवं लागानीको साागठनिक क्षेत्र संग सम्वन्धित विषय हो । यसलाई प्राथमिकतामा राख्नु नेपालको नव निर्माणका लागि जरुरी छ ।
११. नेपालको शेयर बजारमा कानूनको परिधि तथा तोकिएको हदसम्म गैरनेपालीलाई समेत लगानी गर्न प्रोत्साहन गर्नका लागि कानूनी प्रावधानको खााचो छ ।
अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय लगानी कानुन
१२. नेपालमा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय लगानीलाई प्रोत्साहन गर्न तथा “बेल्ट एण्ड रोड इनिसिएटिभ (बिआरआई) का लागी नेपाललाई गन्तव्य बनाउदै यसका लागि आवश्यक दक्ष कानूनी जनशक्ति उत्पादन गर्न अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय लगानी कानून, अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापार कानून, इन्धन तथा पुर्वाधार विकास कानून, बौद्धिक सम्पत्ति कानून तथा कर्पोरेट म्यानेजमेण्ट ल को अध्ययन–अनुसन्धान सम्वन्धमा सरकारले लगानी गर्न ढिलो भइसकेको छ । लगानीका जोखिमहरुलाई सुरक्षित गर्न तथा अन्तराष्ट्रिय लगानीलाई नेपालमा आकर्षण गर्न पनि यो विषय प्राथमिकतामा पर्नुपर्दछ ।
चीनसंग भएको सम्झौता तथा समझदारीको कार्यान्वयन
१३. मित्ररास्ट्र चीन संग भएका पुराना परियोजनाहरुको अविलम्ब क्र्यन्वायाँ एवं समापन अहिलेको प्राथमिकता हो I
१४. प्रधानमन्त्री के. पी. ओलीको सन २०१५ मा बेइजिङ भ्रमणका क्रममा नेपाल र चीनबीच भएका दशवटै सम्झौता वा समझदारीमा खुला व्यापार क्षेत्रको सम्भाव्यता अध्ययनदेखि लिएर नेपालमा तेल तथा ग्यासको अन्वेषणसम्मका विषय समावेश छन् । पारवाहन सम्झौताबाट भविष्यमा काजकिस्तान लगायत अन्य मुलुकबाट पेट्रोलियम आयात गर्दा चिनियाा भूमिको प्रयोग गर्न मार्ग प्रशस्त भएको छ । भ्रमणका बेला अन्तरदेशीय सडक तथा रेल सञ्जाल निर्माण, अरनिको राजमार्ग र स्याफ्रुवेसी–रसुवागढी राजमार्ग सञ्चालनमा ल्याउन र मर्मत सम्भार गर्न, किमाथान्का–खाादबारी–धनकुटा सडक निर्माण गर्न पनि चिनिया पक्ष सहमत भएको थियो । यी प्रत्येक विषयलाई बजेटले उल्लेख गर्नु तथा त्यसका लागि यथोचित विनियोजन गर्नु वर्तमान सरकारको प्रतिवद्धता हो । यो सोहि रुपमा बजेट मा देखिनु पर्दछ I
प्रादेशिक राजधानी
१५. अन्तत: प्रत्येक प्रदेशको लगभग केन्द्र बिन्दुमा पर्ने गरी वस्ती विकास तथा आर्थिक प्रयोजनले उचित देखिने क्षेत्रमा प्रादेशिक राजधानी सहरको योजना तथा निर्माण कार्यको शुभारम्भ अपेक्षित छ । अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय मापडण्दहरुका आधारमा यस्ता शहरहरुको ‘डिजाइन’हुनु र यसमा स्थानीय जनतालाइ लगानीको अवसर प्रदान गर्न त्यस क्षेत्रको दीर्घकालिन विकासका लागि पनि जरुरी हुनेछ । यस प्रकृयाबाट नेपाली संस्कृति, वास्तुशिल्प, कला एवं प्रादेशिकतालाई नमुनाको रुपमा स्थापित गर्नुका साथै शहरिकरणको संगठित अभ्यासलाई पनि स्थापित गर्न सकिने छ । शहर निर्माण अत्यन्त आधुनिक सोच हो । यो सोचलाई उक्त राजधानी शहरहरुको माध्यमबाट गाउँ गाउँमा पुर्याउन सकिन्छ ।
(डा. युवराज खतिवडालाइ उहाँ अर्थमन्त्रीमा नियुक्ति हुनुअघि फेब्रुअरी २३, २०१८ मा व्यक्तिगत रुपमा ‘बिफिंग’ गरिएको टिप्पणी)
संघीयकरणको वर्तमान सन्दर्भमा नेपालको संविधान, २०७२ ले कायम गरेको संघीयताको मूल्यमान्यता बमोजिम राष्ट्रिय रुपमा वृक्षारोपणलाई पर्याप्त महत्व दिादै वन क्षेत्रका केही महत्वपूर्ण विषयहरुमा जिम्मेवारी बहन गर्न एउटा राष्ट्रिय निकायको अविलम्ब व्यवस्था गर्नु पर्ने सन्दर्भमा यो टिप्पणी गरिंदैछ ।
घट्दो वन आवरण (फरेष्ट कभर)
बढ्दो वन विनाश समग्र नेपालको एउटा ठूलो समस्या हो । नेपाल सरकारले विविध कारणले नेपालको भूभागको कम्तिमा ४० प्रतिशत वन-जंगल कायम राख्ने नीतिको घोषणा गरेको छ ।
वन-जंगल विनाश हुनु पछाडि दुई प्रमुख कारणहरु छन् । पहिलो कारण वन-जंगलमा आम नेपालीको निर्भरता निरन्तर कायम रहनु एवम् यसमा जनसंख्याको निरन्तर चाप रहनु नै हो । वन क्षेत्रको अतिक्रमण तथा वन पैदावारका लागि हुने प्रतिस्पर्धा निरन्तर बढ्दै रहेको समस्या हो । वन विनाशको अर्को कारण मुलुकको पूर्वाधार विकासको आवश्यकता पूरा गर्न वन क्षेत्रको फडानी गर्दै निर्माण कम्पनीहरुलाई जग्गाजमिन उपलब्ध गराउनु पर्ने बाध्यता पनि हो ।
सडक, जलविद्युत जस्ता पूर्वाधारका लागि निरन्तर वन क्षेत्र कटानीमा परेका छन् । प्राथमिकता प्राप्त क्षेत्रमा स्वागत गरिएका वैदेशिक लगानीका लागि चाहिने जग्गाका लागि पनि वन क्षेत्र दिइादै छ । यसलाई अस्वीकार गर्न सकिने अवस्था नभएकाले वर्तमान वन नीति तथा राष्ट्रिय वन एवम् संरक्षित वन क्षेत्रका वनहरु फडानी गरी जग्गा उपलब्ध गराउन वन ऐन, २०४९ र राष्ट्रिय निकुञ्ज तथा वन्यजन्तु संरक्षण ऐन, २०२९ र यस अन्तर्गत बनाइएका कार्यविधिहरुले वन फडानी गरी जग्गा उपलब्ध गराउादै आएको छ । यस सम्बन्धमा घोषित प्रक्रिया अनुसार योजना सञ्चालन गर्ने पक्षले सरकारबाट प्राप्त वन क्षेत्र बमोजिमको जमिन अन्यत्र उपलब्ध गराउने तथा सोमा नियमानुसार वृक्षारोपण गरी उपलब्ध गराउनु पर्ने व्यवस्था छ । तर यस बमोजिमका कामकारबाहीहरु उत्साहवर्द्धक रुपमा हुनसकेका छैनन ।
वन आवरणलाई अहिलेको वर्तमान स्तरमा कायम राखिराख्न एकातर्फ वन क्षेत्रलाई निरन्तर जोगाउनु पर्ने भएको छ भने अर्कोतर्फ विकासका लागि मासिए बमोजिमको वन क्षेत्र पुनः सिर्जना गर्न वृक्षारोपण गर्ने कार्यलाई बलियो सांगठनिक ढााचा अन्तर्गत ल्याउनु पर्ने तथा यो कार्य विशिष्ट व्यवसायिक क्षमता सम्पन्न बनाउन आधुनिक मापदण्डहरुको प्रयोग गर्नु पनि त्यत्तिकै आवश्यक छ । वृक्षारोपणलाई आमजनता माझ मुनाफायुक्त लगानीका रुपमा स्थापना नगरी वा यसका लागि प्रतिस्पर्धाशील बजारको व्यवस्था नगरिकन वन-जंगलको भविष्य सुरक्षित गर्न सकिादैन ।
नेपालमा मुनाफाको उद्देश्यले पूर्वाधार विकासमा लगानी गर्न आउने स्वदेशी वा विदेशी कुनै कम्पनीलाई पनि जग्गा खरिद गर्ने, त्यसमा मापदण्ड बमोजिम वृक्षारोपण गर्ने एवम् त्यसको व्यवस्थापन गरी हुर्काएर बस्ने चाहना हुादैन । यसका अतिरिक्त त्यस्ता लगानीकर्ता वा निर्माताले आफ्नो व्यवसायिकता नभएको क्षेत्रमा नेपालको आवश्यकता बमोजिम काम गर्ने आशा पनि गर्न सकिादैन । अतः वृक्षारोपण सम्बन्धी अहिलेको सोचमा परिवर्तन आवश्यक देखिन्छ । यो परिवर्तनले विकासका प्रक्रियाहरुलाई प्रोत्साहन गर्दै वृक्षारोपणको माध्यमबाट नेपालको वन-जंगल तथा यसको पर्यावरणीय क्षमतालाई निरन्तर कायम गर्ने व्यवस्था हुनु पर्दछ । यसै उद्देश्यले राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरणको आवश्यकता हुन गएको हो ।
हाल वृक्षारोपणको विषय वन तथा भूसंरक्षण मन्त्रालयको क्षेत्राधिकार अन्तर्गत पर्दछ । मन्त्रालयले यस सम्बन्धमा आˆनो विभागीय संरचनाहरु – विशेष गरी वन विभाग तथा राष्ट्रिय निकुञ्ज तथा वन्यजन्तु संरक्षण विभाग – को बलियोसाग प्रयोग गर्न एवम् निरन्तर सफलता प्राप्त गर्न सकेको छैन । मुलुकमा अहिले वन उपयोग क्षेत्रमा तीनवटा प्रमुख निकायहरु कार्यरत छन् ।
टिम्बर कर्पोरेसन अफ नेपाल सन् १९६१ देखि अर्द्धस्वायत्त निकायका रुपमा टिम्बर संकलन तथा आपूर्ति व्यवसायमा संलग्न छ । तर वृक्षारोपण यसको प्राथमिकता होइन । त्यसैगरी विकास समिति ऐन अन्तर्गत स्थापित वन पैदावार विकास समिति पनि सन् १९७५ देखि कार्यरत संस्था हो । यसको अभिमुखिकरण वृक्षारोपण गर्ने तर्फ रहेता पनि यसले मूलतः धेरै पहिले गरिएका वृक्षारोपणको रेखदेख तथा स्थापित वन-जंगलबाट वैज्ञानिक वन व्यवस्थापनको माध्यमद्वारा वन पैदावारमा आधारित उद्योगहरुलाई नियमित रुपमा वन पैदावार आपूर्ति गर्ने हो । उच्च वृद्धिदर भएका रुखबिरुवाहरु वृक्षारोपण गरी काठ-दाउरा र अन्य वन पैदावार उत्पादन गर्ने उद्देश्य यसले राखेको छ । तथापि यसले पछिल्ला वर्षहरुमा उल्लेखनीय प्रगति गर्न सकेको छैन । यस सम्बन्धमा तेस्रो महत्वपूर्ण संस्था जडिबुटी उत्पादन तथा प्रशोधन कम्पनी लिमिटेड हो । यो कम्पनी ऐन अन्तर्गत स्थापित सार्वजनिक कम्पनीका रुपमा कार्यरत छ । तर वृक्षारोपण यसको कार्यादेशमा पर्दैन ।
यी तीनवटै संस्थाहरुको भविष्य तथा उत्पादकत्व वन-जंगलको विद्यमानता तथा तिनको निरन्तर वृद्धिमा निर्भर गर्दछ । तर यस सम्बन्धमा विशेष प्रगति हुन सकेको छैन । त्यसका कारणहरुमा सांगठनिक, व्यवस्थापकीय तथा व्यवसायिकरण गर्न नसक्नु लगायतका रहेका छन् । नेपालको संविधान, २०७२ ले नेपाललाई संघीय लोकतान्त्रिक गणतन्त्रात्मक राज्यका रुपमा रुपान्तरण गरेको परिप्रेक्ष्यमा मुलुकको वन क्षेत्र पनि यसको प्रभावमा परेको छ । अब वन-जंगल सम्बन्धी विषय केवल केन्द्रीय स्थानमा रहेको नेपाल सरकारको एकाधिकारको विषय रहेन । अतः संविधानका प्रावधानहरुका कारणहरुले गर्दा टिम्बर कर्पोरेसन अफ नेपाल, वन पैदावार विकास समिति एवम् जडिबुटी उत्पादन तथा प्रशोधन कम्पनी केवल केन्द्रीय मापदण्डमा मात्र व्यवस्थापन हुन सक्दैन ।
यी संस्थाहरुले गर्ने सबै कार्य अब मूलतः प्रादेशिक मापददण्डमा पर्दछन् । संघीय वन नीति बनाउने विषय नेपाल सरकारको अधिकारमा भए पनि व्यवस्थापनको विषय अब सो नीति तथा त्यस अन्तर्गत बनेको कानुन अनुरुप प्रादेशिक तथा स्थानीय तहको अधिकारमा समेत पर्दछ । एकातर्फ यी संस्थाहरुलाई राष्ट्रिय आवश्यकता बमोजिम व्यवसायिकरण एवम् विशिष्टिकरण गर्नु जरुरी छ भने अर्कोतर्फ संघीय नेपालको मापदण्ड बमोजिम रुपान्तरण गर्नु जरुरी छ । यसरी रुपान्तरण गर्दा भइरहेको वनको व्यवस्थापन गर्ने वा त्यसबाट फाइदा लिने कार्यमा मात्र सीमित नभई राष्ट्रिय आवश्यकतालाई दृष्टिगत गर्दै सघन वृक्षारोपणका माध्यमबाट पातलिएको वनको संवर्द्धन तथा मुलुकमा निरन्तर अपेक्षित वन आवरण कायम राख्ने तर्फ पनि लक्षित हुनु पर्दछ । यसका लागि क्षतिपूर्तिका रुपमा गरिने वृक्षारोपण पनि प्रभावकारी बनाइनु पर्दछ ।
संवैधानिक व्यवस्था
नयाा संविधान अनुसार राज्यलाई तीन तहमा विभाजन गरिएको छ – संघीय, प्रादेशिक एवम् स्थानीय तह । संविधानले तीन तहको संघीय संरचना गरे जस्तै प्रत्येक तहका लागि शासन कार्य सञ्चालनार्थ अधिकारहरुको सूची पनि सुनिश्चित गरेको छ । केही अधिकारहरु साझा सूची अन्तर्गत कायम गरिएका छन् । एउटा साझा सूचीले संघ तथा प्रदेश बीचको साझा अधिकारलाई उल्लेख गरेको छ भने अर्को साझा सूचीले संघ, प्रदेश तथा स्थानीय तह बीचको साझा सूचीलाई उल्लेख गरेको छ । आˆनो सूची बमोजिम कामकारबाही गर्ने अधिकार प्रत्येक संघीय तहलाई छ । साझा सूचीमा उल्लिखित अधिकारहरु एकअर्कासाग मिलेर प्रयोग गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ । अतः प्रत्येक तहले आफ्नो अधिकार क्षेत्र बमोजिम अधिकारको प्रयोग गर्न एवम् कानुन बनाई लागु गर्न सक्ने हैसियत संविधानले सुनिश्चित गरेको छ ।
व्यवस्थापन वा प्रयोग
परिवर्तित सन्दर्भमा नेपालका वन-जंगल तथा तिनको व्यवस्थापन वा प्रयोग सम्बन्धी अधिकारहरु पनि तीन तहका सरकारहरु बीच बााडफााटमा पर्दछ । संघको अधिकारको सूचीमा वन सम्बन्धी दुईवटा विषयहरु परेका छन् । पहिलोमा राष्ट्रिय तथा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय वातावरण व्यवस्थापन, राष्ट्रिय निकुञ्ज, वन्यजन्तु आरक्ष तथा सिमसार क्षेत्र, राष्ट्रिय वन नीति र कार्बन सेवा पर्दछन् । दोस्रोमा भूउपयोग नीति, वस्ती विकास नीति, पर्यटन नीति र वातावरण अनुकूलन पर्दछन् । यी विषयहरुमा संघीय सरकारले आवश्यक अधिकारको प्रयोग गर्दछ । त्यसैगरी प्रादेशिक अधिकारको सूचीमा प्रदेशभित्रको राष्ट्रिय वन, जल उपयोग, वातावरण व्यवस्थापन, भूमि व्यवस्थापन इत्यादि पर्दछ । प्रदेश र संघीय अधिकारको साझा सूचीमा प्रदेश सीमा नदी, जलमार्ग, वातावरण संरक्षण, जैविक विविधता, सम्पत्ति प्राप्ति, अधिग्रहण र अधिकारको सिर्जना, भूमि नीति र सो सम्बन्धी कानुन जस्ता विषयहरु पर्दछन् । अन्तरप्रादेशिक रुपमा फैलिएको जंगल, हिमाल, वन संरक्षण क्षेत्र, जल उपयोग जस्ता विषय पनि संघ र प्रदेशको साझा अधिकारको सूचीमा छन् ।
अधिकारहरु केवल संघ र प्रदेशका बीचमा मात्र बााडफााट नगरेर तेस्रो तहको रुपमा कायम गरिएको स्थानीय तहको अधिकारको सूचीमा पनि रहेको छ । स्थानीय तहको अधिकार सूचीमा वातावरण संरक्षण र जैविक विविधता र जलाधार तथा वन्यजन्तुलाई उल्लेख गरिएको छ । संघ, प्रदेश र स्थानीय तहको अधिकारको साझा सूची भने फराकिलो छ । यसमा वन-जंगल, वन्यजन्तु, चराचुरुंगी, जलउपयोग, वातावरण, पर्यावरण तथा जैविक विविधता समावेश छन् ।
अधिकारको उपरोक्त बमोजिमको बााडफााट र प्रयोगलाई एकातर्फ वन तथा वातावरण लगायतका राज्यका निर्देशक सिद्धान्त र नीतिहरुले प्रभावित गरेका छन् भने अर्कोतर्फ संघीय सरकारको जिम्मेवारीले पनि यसको प्रयोगलाई प्रभावित गरेको छ । जस्तो धारा २३२ -१) ले संघ, प्रदेश र स्थानीय तह बीचको सम्बन्ध सहकारिता, सहअस्तित्व र समन्वयको सिद्धान्तमा आधारित हुनुपर्ने उल्लेख गर्दछ । यसै धाराको उपधारा (२) मा नेपाल सरकारले राष्ट्रिय महत्वका विषयमा र प्रदेशहरू बीच समन्वय गर्नुपर्ने विषयमा प्रदेश मन्त्रिपरिषदलाई यो संविधान र संघीय कानुन बमोजिम आवश्यक निर्देशन दिन सक्नेछ र त्यस्तो निर्देशनको पालना गर्नु सम्बन्धित प्रदेश मन्त्रिपरिषदको कर्तव्य हुनेछ भनी अझ स्पष्ट गरेको छ । त्यसैगरी उपधारा (८) ले नेपाल सरकारले आफै वा प्रदेश सरकार मार्फत गाउा कार्यपालिका वा नगर कार्यपालिकालाई यो संविधान र संघीय कानुन बमोजिम आवश्यक सहयोग गर्न र निर्देशन दिन सक्नेछ । त्यस्तो निर्देशनको पालन गर्नु गाउा कार्यपालिका वा नगर कार्यपालिकाको कर्तव्य हुनेछ भनी स्पष्ट प्रावधानको व्यवस्था गरेको छ ।
अन्त्यमा, धारा २३५ (१) ले संघ, प्रदेश र स्थानीय तह बीच समन्वय कायम गर्न संघीय संसदले आवश्यक कानुन बनाउने छ भन्ने उल्लेख छ । उपरोक्त सबै प्रावधानहरुले संघीय सरकारलाई अधिकारको बााडफााटको सम्बन्धमा तथा विशेषगरी साझा सूचीमा रहेका अधिकारहरु प्रयोगको सम्बन्धमा आवश्यक नीति तथा ऐनकानुनहरु निर्माण गर्ने अधिकार दिएको छ । यस्ता कामकारबाही नेपालको संविधानले अपनाएको संघीय आदर्श बमोजिम नभएको वा हुन नसकेको इत्यादि आधारमा चित्त नबुझ्ने प्रदेश वा स्थानीय तह न्यायका लागि सर्वोच्च अदालत जान सक्दछ । तथापि संघीय सरकारको अधिकारहरुलाई उपरोक्त विषयमा संविधानले स्पष्ट रुपमा उल्लेख गरेेको छ ।
वन-जंगल व्यवस्थापन सम्बन्धी विद्यमान अवस्था संविधानको उपरोक्त मापदण्ड बमोजिम वृक्षारोपणलाई राष्ट्रिय रुपमा अभिमुखिकरण गर्दै नेपालको वन क्षेत्रलाई कायम राख्ने, यसको अभिवृद्धि गर्ने, यसबाट प्राप्त गर्ने वन पैदावारलाई बढाउादै लग्ने उद्देश्यमा अब प्रदेश सरकारहरुको पनि उत्तिकै भूमिका हुने छ ।
यो उद्देश्य प्राप्त गर्न प्रदेश सरकारहरुको भूमिकालाई समेत स्थापित गर्दै संघीय सरकारको नीतिगत पहलमा एउटा नयाा संस्थाको आवश्यकता महसुस भएको छ । यो संस्थाको उद्देश्य वृक्षारोपणलाई राष्ट्रिय अभियानका रुपमा कायम गर्दै नेपाल टिम्बर कर्पोरेसन, वन पैदावार विकास समिति एवम् जडिबुटी उत्पादन तथा प्रशोधन कम्पनी लिमिटेड यी तीनवटै संस्थाहरुको एकीकरण तथा संवर्द्धन गर्ने हुनेछ । यो एकीकरणबाट एउटा राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरणको स्थापना हुन सक्दछ । यो नयाा संस्थाको स्थापनाबाट ती पुराना संस्थाहरु नयाामा समाहित हुनेछन्।
राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरण ऐन
राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरण एउटा बलियो राष्ट्रिय संस्था हुनेछ । यसले वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार दुवै क्षेत्रमा काम गर्नेछ ।
क्षतिपूर्तिका रुपमा गरिने वृक्षारोपणका साथसाथै सम्पूर्ण प्रकारका वृक्षारोपण गर्ने यो कार्यमा आफू तथा अन्य सम्बन्धित पक्षहरुसाग सहकार्य गर्ने, निजी एवम् सार्वजनिक साझेदारिता स्थापना गर्ने, आवश्यकता बमोजिम जग्गा प्राप्त गर्ने, निर्माताहरुबाट प्राप्त हुने क्षतिपूर्तिको रकम सरकारबाट सिधै प्राप्त गर्ने, जग्गा संकलनका लागि ‘ल्याण्ड बैंक’ खोल्ने, यसका लागि सरकारबाट ‘सिड मनी’ प्राप्त गर्ने, प्रदेशहरुसाग सहकार्य गर्ने, आफ्नो कार्य क्षेत्रको सरोकारका विषयमा अध्ययन-अनुसन्धान गर्ने गराउने, यस सम्बन्धमा सबै प्रदेश तथा स्थानीय सरकारहरुलाई आवश्यक प्राविधिक सल्लाह तथा प्रशिक्षण उपलब्ध गराउने तथा नयाा सिर्जित वनहरुको पैदावार बिक्री-वितरण गर्ने गराउने जस्ता सबै कार्यहरु गर्नेछ । यो संस्थाले सरकारी तथा गैरसरकारी मुनाफाप्रेरित वा सार्वजनिक उद्देश्यले काम गर्ने दुवै क्षेत्रसाग काम गर्नेछ । विशेषगरी यस प्राधिकरणले वन-जंगल बापत प्राप्त क्षतिपूर्तिको रकम परियोजना निर्माताहरुबाट नेपाल सरकार मार्फत सिधै प्राप्त गर्नेछ तथा यसको प्रयोग घोषित उद्देश्यका लागि गर्ने विषयमा सुनिश्चितता प्रदान गर्नेछ ।
यो प्राधिकरण एउटा बोर्डबाट सञ्चालित हुनेछ । यो बोर्डको नेतृत्वको चयन संघीय सरकारले गर्नेछ भने यसका सदस्यहरु प्रदेश सरकारले चयन गर्ने छ । सम्बन्धित क्षेत्रका प्रतिनिधिहरुको प्रतिनिधित्व पनि यो बोर्डमा सुनिश्चित गरिने छ । प्राधिकरणको आफ्नो बेग्लै कोष हुने छ । यसमा निर्माताहरुबाट प्राप्त क्षतिपूर्तिको रकम लगायत नेपाल सरकारबाट पाइने अनुदान, अन्य क्षेत्रबाट प्राप्त सहयोग र प्राधिकरण स्वयंले गरेको आयआर्जनबाट प्राप्त गरेको रकम जम्मा हुनेछ । यो रकमको खर्च प्राधिकरणले स्वतन्त्र रुपमा व्यवसायिक सोचका आधारमा गर्ने छ । यसका कार्यक्रमहरु आवधिक रुपमा तयार गरिएको जंगल वृक्षारोपण विकास योजनाका आधारमा खर्च गरिनेछन् । प्राधिकरणले नेपाल सरकारबाट आवश्यक कर्मचारीहरु प्राप्त गर्नेछ । यसका कामकारबाहीहरु नियमित बैठक तथा कार्यालय प्रशासनका माध्यमबाट गरिनेछ । पदाधिकारीहरुले आफ्नो निहित स्वार्थ भएका विषयहरु सम्बन्धी निर्णय प्रक्रियामा संलग्न हुने छैनन् । नेपाल सरकारका सम्बन्धमा प्राधिकरणको सम्पर्क मन्त्रालयका रुपमा वन तथा भूसंरक्षण मन्त्रालय रहनेछ । प्राधिकरणका कामकारबाहीहरुलाई चाहिने नियम विनियम यो स्वयम्ले बनाउन सक्नेछ । यसले गर्ने सबै किसिमका कामकारबाहीहरुको वाषिर्क प्रतिवेदन तयार गरिने छ । यस्तो प्रतिवेदन वन तथा भूसंरक्षण मन्त्रालयमार्फत नेपाल सरकारलाई पठाइने छ ।
राष्ट्रिय वृक्षारोपण तथा वन पैदावार विकास प्राधिकरणका यी सबै व्यवस्थाहरुका लागि एउटा बेग्लै ऐन संघीय संसदबाट पारित गर्नु पर्नेछ । विकास समिति ऐन अन्तर्गत स्थापित संस्थाले संघीय मापदण्डहरु पूरा नगर्न सक्छ । नेपालमा प्राधिकरण सम्बन्धी अरु पनि ऐनहरु आइसकेका छन् । यो नौलो सोच होइन । तथापि मूलतः बोर्डमा भएका प्रदेशका प्रतिनिधिहरुको नियन्त्रणमा रहने संघीय नेतृत्व भएको यो प्राधिकरण नेपालको वर्तमान संविधानको संघीय ढााचा अनुरुपको छ । आफ्नो संघीय ढााचाका कारण यसले वन-जंगललाई मासिन दिने छैन, क्षतिपूर्तिका रुपमा गर्नु पर्ने वृक्षारोपणसहितका वृक्षारोपणलाई बलियो सांगठनिक आधार तथा विभिन्न संस्थाको एकीकरणबाट हुने लाभहरुको अभिवृद्धि गर्नेछ । यसका लागि खर्चको नयाा स्रोत आवश्यक पर्ने छैन ।
वन क्षेत्रका उपरोक्त तीनवटै संस्थाहरु उपर आजका मितिमा नेपाल सरकारले गरेका खर्चहरु यो नयाा प्राधिकरण चलाउनका लागि पर्याप्त हुनेछन् । निर्माताहरुबाट क्षतिपूर्तिका रुपमा प्राप्त गरेको रकमले यसलाई अतिरिक्त आर्थिक बल दिने छ । समग्रमा यो प्राधिकरणले संघीय नेपालको साझा वन-जंगललाई भविष्य दिन सक्नेछ । अतः यसको स्थापनातर्फ सोचिनु आवश्यक छ ।
The question of whether Nepal should go ahead with plans to build a dam with a Chinese firm has become entwined in the wider debate about whether the country should align itself with India or China.
The Nepalese government indicated last week it would abandon the US$2.5 billion deal with Chinese state company China Gezhouba Group.
The deal was signed in June during the administration of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, chairman of the Maoist Centre party, but his government has since been replaced by an interim administration ahead of elections later this month.
Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli – the chairman of the electoral bloc formed by Maoist Centre and the other main Communist group, the Unified Marxist-Leninists – warned against revoking the plan.
“The issue here is about foreign investment and such decisions cannot be taken on a whim,” he said, as the polls for the November 26 provincial and federal elections showed his bloc to be taking the lead.
Has scrapped US$2.5 billion Nepal hydro dam deal with Chinese state firm hurt Beijing’s Himalayan ambitions?
The decision to scrap the project highlights Nepal’s divisions over how close the country should be to China, which has emerged as an alternative to its traditional ally India.
Yet the country’s political instability, which has already seen four prime ministers come
Budi Gandaki
and go since it adopted a new constitution in September 2015, makes it even more difficult to strike the correct balance between the neighbouring Asian giants.
Nepal’s political institutions emerged as part of the peace process to bring Maoist insurgents into the political mainstream following a long-running insurgency.
The dam agreement, signed a few weeks after Nepal joined China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”, was described by Deputy Prime Minister Kamal Thapa as being made “in an irregular and thoughtless manner” when he first revealed the cabinet decision via Twitter on Monday.
The formal decision to scrap the plan was announced by the Ministry of Energy on Friday.
The plan has been criticised because a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese company was signed without an open bidding process as required by law.
Could Nepal’s new communist alliance lead to closer ties with China?
Rupak Sapkota, a researcher at Nepal Institute for Strategic Analyses, said the scrapping of the plan was the result of conflict between Nepalese political factions over their respective alignment with India and China.
“Nepal is still trying to figure out a balanced position between India and China,” he said.
He said the present Congress Party-led government – a transitional one formed ahead of the election – was known to be more pro-India and was trying to show loyalty to Delhi before, assuming the polls were correct, it was replaced by the more pro-China Maoist bloc.
Yet, Madhav Das Nalapat, a geopolitics expert from India’s Manipal University, said the cancelling of the plan “is not reflective of domestic politics but of domestic economic imperatives”.
He said China’s negotiation tactics when dealing with countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan mirrored the hard-headed approach of US or European Union companies rather than offering “friendly” terms and conditions.
Water-rich Nepal has traditionally relied on India for technology and funding to meet its annual requirements of 1,400 megawatts.
Should the project go ahead, the Budhi Gandaki dam – to be built about 50km west of Kathmandu – could generate 1,200MW.
Sapkota said Nepal needed more hydroelectric power to help improve the lives of people as well as boost the economy. “We have been waiting for a long time,” he said.
Domestic political divides over whether to engage with China’s belt and road plans to build an infrastructure network across Eurasia and into Africa are hardly exclusive to Nepal.
Pakistan pulls plug on dam deal over China’s ‘too strict’ conditions in latest blow to Belt and Road plans
This week Pakistan also decided to cancel the US$14 billion Diamer-Bhasha dam with China because it could not accept the strict conditions.
In 2015 the Sri Lankan government suspended work on a US$1.4 billion Colombo port deal made by a previous administration, as it faced criticism domestically for being too reliant on Chinese investment.
However last year it decided to resume the project due to its falling foreign reserves.
“Whenever India indicates discreetly that a ‘red line’ has been crossed in a South Asian country’s wooing of China, that country usually draws back rather than trigger a negative reaction from the largest South Asian power. The present government in Kathmandu is following such a line,” Nalapat said.
Zhao Gancheng, head of South Asian studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said this had always been a challenge for China as it continued to increase its investments in developing countries.
“China needs to protect itself more to guarantee that it is signing the deal with the whole country, not the person governing it at that moment,” Zhao said.
“If Nepal shows that its priority is to cater to India whenever pressure is applied, China should be more aware of its own interests and take careful consideration before funding projects in the country in the future.”
This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: India or China? Dilemma as Nepal pulls plug on dam
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Nepal (GoN) with China Gezhouba Water & Power (Group) Co Ltd (CGGC) seven months ago to develop the 1,200-megawatt Budhigandaki Hydropower Project has come under controversy from day one. The project is a storage project that promises to provide the much-needed hydro-electricity to solve the perennial power crisis in Nepal.
The MoU signed on May 4, 2017 paves the way for further formal agreement/s on the planning and implementation of the project. While the project development agreement/s based on the MoU are yet to be inked, the Government is expected to do serious homework about the details and the course to be pursued by the project in the future. Some discussion was undertaken about this project in the Cabinet on May 23, 2017 as well. At that time as well, the intention of the government to hand over the construction contract of the Budhigandaki project to CGGC was clearly ventilated. The project has been in the Government’s considerations for the last four decades. However, the Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the storage project was completed only in 2015. It did not take any position on the development modality for the project at that time. A resettlement plan for families that would be displaced by the reservoir to be constructed in due course had also not taken any shape at that time. The project was estimated to cost USD 2.59 billion, including the cost of land acquisition for storage purposes.
Janardan Sharma, the Minister for Energy signed the MoU with the Chinese company to build the project under the Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Finance (EPC & F) model. The project site is located between Gorkha and Dhading districts, and once constructed, it will be the largest hydropower project in the country as well as the largest storage project ever. The MoU was signed by President Lv Zexiang on behalf of CGGC at the residence and in the presence of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal and the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, Ms Yu Hong.
Budhigandaki Project
Under EPC & F model, the Chinese company will help arrange funding to develop the project and undertake the overall responsibility for executing it. Finances will be mobilized in the form of soft or commercial loans from Chinese financial institutions under terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of Nepal. The MoU sets forth the modality for the exercise of this power.
The objective of this paper is to summarize the legal issues surrounding the project and draw a general conclusion on the state of affairs in this regard. It concludes that all controversies regarding the Budhigandaki project could be reasonably resolved, and it could still be implemented as an exemplary power project within the MoU framework, building on the trust that led to .
Features of the MOU
The CGGC, which is renowned for construction in the areas of power plants, dams, roads, bridges and civil engineering, and has invested and constructed highways; developed real estate; generated hydropower; and manufactured cement and civil explosives, has agreed to carry out the following activities under Article 4 of the MoU:
Facilitate and arrange required financing (soft loan/commercial loan or any other means mutually discussed and agreed upon) from Chinese financial institutions on the terms and conditions acceptable to GoN;
Assist GoN in the development and execution of the Project and undertake the overall responsibility of an executor of the project;
Perform and execute additional studies and investigations if required by CGGC;
Agree to work together with GoN in good faith, through joint and concerted cooperation in accordance with the provisions of this MOU, in order to implement the project on time;
Cooperate and collaborate with Chinese financial institutions to design an appropriate financing structure for the project with the GoN’s assistance where permitting Chinese financial institutions, representatives to visit the Project site, and CGGC will bear the cost and fees as required, on their own;
Execute the Project on the EPC & F basis with an appropriate contract mode under the agreed contract arrangement once the financial requirement is acquired through soft/commercial loan or any other means mutually discussed and agreed upon between and among the concerning parties;
Ensure that all the procurement process during the project development period will be done in a competitive and transparent manner; and
Suggest or intimate related information regarding the progress of work under this MoU to GoN in quarterly basis or earlier as the case may be.
Under Article 5, the MoU provides for a Steering Committee of ten representatives – five from each MoU party. The Committee will ensure the proper implementation of the MoU and will evaluate and determine the priority areas to successfully carry out the project works and possible financial structures for its timely implementation. Once constituted, the Committee will have to meet at least once in a two month time.
Dhading
Additionally, one principal feature of the MOU is that it does not allow any party for the duration of the MOU work with any other third party in pursuit of a contract agreement for the project.
Any party may terminate this MOU, with reason, at any time, by giving thirty days written notice to the other party.
Finally, it is boldly accepted by Article 6.3 that the implementation of the project and related contractual arrangements will depend on the availability of required financial resources.
Belt and Road Initiative
Meanwhile, on the recommendation of the Nepalese side, China has listed the Budhigandaki Hydropower Project as one of the projects to be taken under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).1 Nepal signed a MoU with China to this effect on May 12, 2017, four years after the Intiative was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping as part of his ambitious plan to expand links between Asia, Africa, Europe and beyond through billions of dollars in infrastructure investment. BRI is a priority for Nepal as well. The reason is – it has possibilities for Nepal to open up to the world through the Chinese territories, and easy funding for the infrastructure projects. The volume of the soft loan to be taken for the project is expected to increase following its inclusion in the BRI, which has strong backing of the Chinese government.
Nepal’s energy compulsions
Budhigandaki comes with certain clear possibilities. Energy crisis and heavy load
Tool box
shedding has been a regular problem in Nepal for many years. This owes to lack of investment in energy sector, and limited growth in what has already been invested in this area. The problem became intense when neighboring India imposed an undeclared blockade in 2015, creating supply shortages of cooking gas and petroleum products, in the aftermath of the promulgation of the new Constitution of Nepal. The blockade was India’s response to the supposed failure of the new Constitution to respond to India’s demands communicated to the GoN diplomatically on the issue of constitutional reform. Given the two large earthquakes and the subsequent aftershocks that Nepal faced right before the blockade in early 2015, the effect of the blockade on India locked Nepal’s economy was enormous.
As a landlocked nation, Nepal imports all of its petroleum supplies from neighboring India. Moreover, India had also stopped Nepalese trucks at the Kolkata harbor, Nepal’s principle transit and trade point with India. The blockade choked imports of not only petroleum but also medicines and earthquake relief material. The blockade caused Nepal’s only international airport, Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu, to deny foreign carriers fuel, contributing to further isolation from the outside world and worsening the effects of the ongoing landslides blocking border trade with China. Nearly all sectors of the economy had taken a severe hit, from tourism to transport to domestic factories to agriculture and construction industry. The tactics of blockade is a regular feature of Indian diplomacy in Nepal.
In March 2016, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, who led the country in difficult days, signed 10 separate agreements with China, including the trade and transit treaty that ensured Nepal’s right to access sea as a landlocked nation through the Chinese land. Nepal had never sought this access through Chinese territory before. Thirteen months later, on May 12, 2017, Nepal and China signed the MoU on the Belt and Road Initiative.
Nepal understands that two reservoir projects – Budhigandaki and West Seti are important to meet Nepalese energy crisis. They also particularly help addressing the gap in energy supply between dry months and wet months. In January 2017, Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC) put the initials on a joint venture (JV) agreement to build West Seti Hydropower Project. The government had handed over the project to it in 2012. The Budhigandaki comes as a second major project.
Budhigandaki Project Location and Catchment Area
The project site lies in the adjoining parts of Dhading district of Province No 3 and Gorkha district of Province Number 4. The project site is accessible through Benighat (at about a distance of 80 km from Kathmandu) on Prithvi Highway from Kathmandu to Pokhara. From Benighat, a motorable composite bridge can be used to cross the Trishuli River and access the Dam and Powerhouse site both of which are at a distance of about 1.5 km from the road head.
Catchment Area
Dam site
Dam site
Gorkha: 2,700 km2
Dhading: 900 km2
Nuwakot: 35 km2
China: 1,365 km2
Total: 5,000 km2
About 2 km u/s of the
confluence between
Budhigandaki and
Trhshuli at Benighat
Ghyalchok (Gorkha)
Salang (Dhading)
The salient features of the project have been summarized for the public at the official website of the project.2
Earlier efforts
Until recently, the Government thought of developing the Budhigandaki Hydropower Project in a ‘company model’, in place of its development committee modality accepted later. It was argued that the company modality will be more efficient, independent, and less susceptible to influence from political intervention.3 Ultimately, however, the development committee approach was chosen. The MoU signed with CGGC, which gives new possibilities, have already been noted above.
Land Expropriation
Land expropriation and compensation is a major issue in the Budhigandaki undertaking. The project is presently acquiring land in the catchment area of Dhading and Gorkha districts. The district administration offices of Dhading and Gorkha are currently extending compensation to owners of the land required for the construction of the project. Around 58,000 ropanies of land need to be acquired for this purpose. The number of the affected households are said to be more than 8,000. The reservoir of the storage project will submerge 3,560 houses and the occupants will need to be resettled with proper compensation. Likewise, 4,557 households will be partially affected by the project and need appropriate compensation.4
The government has given due priority to the Budhigandaki project in the budget for fiscal year 2017-18 as well, with allocation of Rs 10.17 billion for distribution of land compensation. The process has been rather slow, although all concerned stakeholders believe that it should be expedited.
Stakeholders’ claims
The stakeholoders of Budhigandaki have several concerns on the governmental initiative. Some stakeholders have clearly pointed out that the deal with CGGC has been reached without carrying out competitive bidding. The importance of bidding process in a huge project like this cannot be underscored. Surprisingly, though, contracts for projects below 100 MW capacity such as Kabeli A had been awarded only after carrying out competitive bidding in the past. This certainly has raised eyebrows in Nepal.
Some stakeholders have also questioned the Chinese company’s capacity to develop the project, given Budhigandaki’s enormity. The contract given to it to construct the 22 MW Chilime power project was abrogated after it completed only 10 per cent of works during the contract period in fiscal year 1997-98.5
In the fiscal year of 2012-13, the company landed the contract to carry out civil works of 42.5 MW Lower Sanjen hydropower project – a subsidiary of Chilime – but its performance was dismal. As a result, its security deposit was forfeited.6
Some think the EPCF MOU with CGGC is against the constitutional provision in Article 59 (5) of the Constitution, which ensures certain investment to the local communities in development of natural resources.
Agriculture and Water Resources Committee (AWRC)
The Budhigandaki Project has also been an issue at Agriculture and Water Resources Committee in the parliament.
The Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Water Resources has recently questioned why the decision to award the project to China Gezhouba Group Corporation was taken, going against the Committee’s past direction to build the project by utilizing domestic resources. Lawmakers also accused the government of handing over the national pride project to the Chinese firm without any competition and breaching the country’s public procurement laws. Earlier, after holding multiple discussions with Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Citizen’s Investment Trust (CIT) and Nepal Telecom (NT) as well as the project’s officials and experts, the house panel, had concluded that the mega project could be developed by utilizing domestic resources.
The validity of the decision has also been questioned stating that the agreement has been signed without getting it endorsed by the cabinet.
China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC)
The concerns regarding CGGC must also be noted here. CGGC is currently building the 30MW Chameliya Hydropower Project in the far west and the 60MW Upper Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project in the central region in Nepal. The company could not construct both these projects in slated time. This raises the issue whether the CGGC can perform efficiently in the case of the Buddhigandaki.
CGGC has faced criticism time and again for inflating the cost of the project by citing various excuses and political hiccups. The construction cost of the Chameliya project has gone up to Rs 550 million per megawatt, while normally, the construction cost of a project is Rs 150 million to 200 million per megawatt. Moreover, the project, which was supposed to have concluded in May 2011, is yet to be completed.7 Nepal Electricity Authority has been bearing huge losses not only in terms of revenue but also due to increase in foreign exchange rate owing to the project construction delays, according to NEA officials. Besides, a case related to the company about tax evasion over fake VAT bill of over billion rupees is sub-judice at the Revenue Tribunal Office.8
A local newspaper has claimed that CGGC’s subsidiaries had been blacklisted by the World Bank on May 29, 2015. The World Bank’s move was based on ‘acknowledgement of misconduct by these entities in three World Bank-funded projects in China in relation to water conservation, earthquake recovery and flood management’. This meant that the company and its subsidiaries were ineligible to participate in any contract of the World Bank for 18 months. The claim has been refuted by the Company. It is said that the company had never landed in controversy. It is said that “CGGC is just one of the over 150 subsidiaries of China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC). It was some other subsidiary company of CEEC that had landed in controversy, not CGGC.”9
Press Release of Former Prime Minister
The Budhigandaki deal has come under criticism of former prime minister and coordinator of Naya Shakti Party Nepal Baburam Bhattarai as well. He criticised the government’s decision to award the construction contract for the Budhigandaki without a competitive bidding process.10 He emphasized that the government should build large infrastructural projects like Budhigandaki itself. His party has accused the government for signing the MoU with the company without formulating proper policies and executing directives on EPCF model. According to Om Astha Rai, “the fact that ex-Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai, viewed by many as pro-India, demanded the contract be scrapped fueled speculation that New Delhi indeed did not want the Chinese involved in such a large reservoir project upstream.”11
Issues that need to be addressed
Article 35 of Nepal Electricity Act 2049 states:
Government of Nepal may enter into contract for Generation, Transmission or Distribution of Electricity: Notwithstanding anything written elsewhere in this Act, Government of Nepal, by entering into a contract with any person or corporate body, may do or cause to do the generation, transmission or distribution of electricity subject to the terms and conditions as mentioned in such contract.
There is no doubt that Article 35 clearly gives power to the Government of Nepal to sign any contract with any person or body corporate for the purpose of generation, transmission or distribution of electricity. Its power to sign any MOU with China Gezhouba Water & Power (Group) Co Ltd (CGGC) is therefore legally sanctioned as long as the power is exercised in the interest of the country and without defeating the purpose of the law.
An open bidding process, had it been resorted to, may have given clear choice to the government in the matter of selection of the party, the cost of the project, the construction time, the amount of foreign currency involved and its interest, and also the overall national liability. The project cost of USD 2.59 billion itself is a huge issue. This amount is an estimated cost. According to Ratna Sansar Shrestha, a financial analyst in the energy sector, it obviously includes a handsome profit to the contractor, overhead expenditure, contingency expenditure as well as commissions that go to politicians, senior bureaucracy, brokers and so on. The real project cost will come up only after there is transparent competition between willing contractors.12 The signing of the MoU has certainly denied the people of Nepal an opportunity to see the transparency in the dealing.
As far as Nepal is concerned, there are already some good examples of projects completed in smaller amounts than the estimated amounts. For example, the hydropower project Kaligandaki – A had a declared estimated cost of USD 45 crore. It was completed using USD 35 crore. On the civil side, the project cost Rs 12,00,00,000 instead of the projected cost of Rs 7,00,00,000. Even with this variation, Kaligandaki – A was completed in less than the estimated amount. This means the real cost was 22 percent less than the projected cost. Similarly, while the estimated cost of Marshyangdi hydropower project was USD 32,33,00,000, the real cost was only USD 24,98,00,000. It was a difference of approximately 25 percent. The project was built by Nepal Electricity Authority itself.13
One additional example is Bhotekoshi Hydropower Project. It was carried out by the private sector. Its estimated cost was USD 10,00,00,000. Based on international competitive bidding, the contract was signed for USD 4,80,00,000 only. This amount is less by 52 percent of the estimated cost. This project was contracted out to CGGC. It is clear that estimated cost are liberally projected and there is always an effort to show high cost in order to work out an inflated power purchase agreement before the projected is kick started. It is thus clear that the Budhigandaki Project could not get the advantage of international competitive bidding process. It is thus the opinion of the financial analyst that the project could have possibly been contracted out for less than USD 200 billion had a transparent process been followed.14
Another issue involved here is the issue of cost increment. The MoU does not state anywhere what fixed cost the executor has to execute this project as proposed. This simply means that the regular cost increment is going to be the recurring feature of this project as well. A case in point is Mid-marshyangdi Hydropower Project. The project was contracted out for Rs 13,00,00,000. The contractor has already received Rs 27,00.00.000. It continues to claim further payment on various grounds. It is indeed clear that most of the projects operationalized by the Nepal Electricity Authority are based on inflated estimated cost. The main reason is the power contract management capacity of the NEA. The Kulekhani storage project is yet another case in point. Its estimated cost was USD 6,80,000. The real expenditure claimed was USD 12,36,000. Given this scenario, there is no reason why this situation does not repeat in the case of Budhigandaki. While the MOU does not fix the project cost, it does not give any clue as to how the cost will be maintained under certain standards. The more the cost increment, the more profit to the executor. It is the country which will have to bear the loss.15
Yet another startling issue about Budhigandaki is the project period. The MoU does not state by what deadline the project will have to be completed. The project delay is mostly a gain on the part of the contractor and loss on the part of the Government. The delay causes increase in the cost including additional interest in the project debt. If the project is late by one year, for example, the loss of electricity revenue will be 4,25,00,000 units. If the electricity tariff is fixed at Rs 5 per unit, the loss will be US 22,25,00,00,000. When Kulekhani was 21 month late, the Government lost USD 1,50,00,000. When Marshyangdi was late by 7 months, the country lost USD 1,7,00,000. When Kaligandaki A was 18 month late the loss was USD 10,00,00,000. In the case of Mid-marshyangdi, the delay of 50 months caused the loss of USD 13,00,00,000. Chilime was delayed by 40 months because of this same contractor. The fates of Chameliya and Trishuli which have still been struggling are still unsure. They are definitely causing huge losses to the Government.16
The financial management is yet another important issue. Under the MOU, the responsibility to garner necessary finance has been given to the contractor itself. While the contractor is a Chinese entity, the entities it is exploring for finance are also supposed to be Chinese. In that case – does this scenario affect the quality of negotiation? is an open question. The importance of financial arrangement under transparent conditions from the open financial market cannot be minimized. It has implications for interest rate. It is not clear how the government is going to check the unfair dealings between parties in the matter of loan negotiation and payment back period.
It appears that the loan lent out to Nepal will be in Chinese currency. Although there is no specific mention about this, since the financial entities will be Chinese, the currency released will be in Chinese. Nepalese currency is a weak currency. Even though the interest rate is so low, the principal amount itself is going to be always heavier. For example, 1 USD in 1995 was equivalent Rs 50. Now after 22 years the convertible rate is more than RS 100. In other words, had the Government taken USD 1 crore (i.e. 50,00,00,000) as a loan in 1995, and the amount remained unpaid, the principal amount now will be more than USD 100,00,000. The interest is quite an additional issue.17
As the project is to be worked out under the Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Finance (EPC & F) model, the project company will enter into a contract with the EPC & F contractor which will then enter into various subcontracts with its sub-contractors for performance of discrete portions of work. The EPC & F contractor provides the project company with a single point of responsibility to ensure that the project is completed on time and meets the performance requirements. The necessity of demanding a “performance guarantee” is therefore an important issue. In this type of contract, the contract price may be inflated as the EPC & F contractor is assuming most of the risk. Often there is limited ability of project company to be involved in the performance of the works. Inefficient use of resources is a possibility because there is no pooling of knowledge and skills. Risks may be placed on those unable to influence or manage them.
Conclusion
The MOU signed on 4 June 2017 is a skeleton document. As it is a skeleton, there is room for debate and also for doubts about the arrangement. Given Nepal’s experience with hydropower projects, the questions raised here, or the concerned expressed in this analysis, do not seem exaggerated.
One significant strength of the MoU is the provision in Article 5. The Steering Committee of ten representatives that it has created is based on the concept of joint management and collective decision making. The Committee has five representatives from each MoU party. It is the responsibility of the Committee to ensure that the MoU is properly implemented. It will also evaluate and determine the priority areas to successfully carry out the project works and possible financial structures for its timely implementation. This provision enables the Committee to create a win-win situation for both the parties.
All issues about law and finance as discussed above could be effectively handled by this joint management. Except the fact that the Budhigandaki project cannot be given to any other company under the existing arrangement, all other issues could be negotiated within the framework of the MoU and according to the recognized legal and business principles. For example, the MoU does not obstruct the joint management to work out a feasible range of investment opportunities to the locals, or the other Nepalese people. There is no reason why Article 59(2) cannot be implemented. Similarly, the Committee may also effectively help implement the public procurement laws that apply as there is a clear provision in the MoU to this effect. This is not a major issue. What is more important is to make the best use of joint management created under the MoU. This is a unique way to make sure that the project creates a win win situation for both the parties.
Again, the Budhigandaki project is a remarkable case. One must keep in mind that both the governments of Nepal and China have undertaken this project because of their understanding with each other, the ongoing energy crisis in Nepal, and a clear effort to establish a model for their future investments in Nepal (despite existing issues in the projects with Chinese companies). The Nepalese drive to seek reliable solution to the energy crisis in the country, and excessive dependence on Indian supply, and the Chinese willingness to establish itself as a dependable business partner in Nepal’s development, both demonstrate the move towards a new scenario. It is now their responsibility to make it happen.
All complications that have been discussed must be solved. The MOU does not deal with any of these complications, but it does not constrain fair and efficient, yet mutually agreed arrangement to work out this MoU. There is a room for model project arrangement even now. As far as China Gezhouba Water & Power (Group) Co Ltd (CGGC) is concerned, it is important that it completes all its projects in Nepal before giving hope to the Nepalese stakeholders that Budhigandaki is going to be different as far as its efficiency is concerned. There is also a media note that “CGGC seems desperate to rebrand its image in Nepal, and there is hope in some quarters that the company will deliver this time because the Chinese government is also keen to see this project completed in eight years.”18
This positive note notwithstanding, a petition has already been filed at the Supreme Court seeking termination of the MOU. The Company is waiting for the court verdict before starting the project.
1See “Project selection for BRI funding goes on” in The Kathmandu Post, September 11, 2017 available at http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-09-11/project-selection-for-bri-funding-goes-on.html 2http://www.bghep.gov.np/salient-features.php 3See “‘Company model’ for Budhigandaki Hydropower project: Energy Minister” in Republica, October 4, 2016. 4http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2017-04-16/dhading-locals-finally-receive-compensation.html 5See “CGGC contract for Budhigandaki in controversy” in The Himalayanm Times, May 31, 2017 6See “CGGC contract for Budhigandaki in controversy” in The Himalayanm Times, May 31, 2017 7See “CGGC contract for Budhigandaki in controversy” in The Himalayanm Times, May 31, 2017 8See “CGGC contract for Budhigandaki in controversy” in The Himalayanm Times, May 31, 2017 9See “CGGC contract for Budhigandaki in controversy” in The Himalayanm Times, May 31, 2017 10See “No-bid contract flays award draws flak,” in The Kathmandu Post, June 9, 2017. Available at http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/printedition/news/2017-06-09/no-bid-contract-award-draws-flak.html 11“Reservoirs of suspicion Nepal is blessed with water resources, but cursed by geopolitics” in Nepali Times, 20-26 October 2017 available at http://nepalitimes.com/article/nation/reservoirs-of-suspicion/hydropower-geopolitics%20,3991 12See Ratna Sansar Shrestha, “Budhigandaki – Kalankit Rastriya Gaurav” in Nagarik Daily, Bhadau 6, 2074. Available at http://www.ratnasansar.com 13Ibid 14See Ratna Sansar Shrestha, “Budhigandaki – Kalankit Rastriya Gaurav” in Nagarik Daily, Bhadau 6, 2074. Available at http://www.ratnasansar.com 15Ibid 16Ibid 17Ibid 18See “Building Budhi Gandaki” in Nepali Times, August 6, 2017.
October 2017
Lecture Notes: Masters by Research in Energy and Infrastructure Law
Kathmandu University
हरेक राष्ट्रनिर्माताले आफूले निर्माण गरेको मुलुकको निरन्तर सुरक्षा कसरी कायम राख्ने भन्ने कुरा सोचेको हुन्छ । यस्तो सोचाईको दुईवटा पक्ष हुन्छन् । पहिलो पक्ष भनेको निर्माण गरिएको मुलुकको स्याहार–सम्भार र आन्तरिक शान्तिसुव्यवस्था कसरी कायम गर्ने भन्ने हो । दोस्रो पक्षका रुपमा मुलुकको बाह्य सुरक्षा पर्दछ । यी दुवै एकअर्कासँग सम्बन्धित विषय हुन् । आन्तरिक सुरक्षा गर्न नसक्ने मुलुकले बाह्य सुरक्षाका लागि काम गर्न सक्दैन ।…Read the Article
एउटा राजनेताका रुपमा नेपालका प्रथम जननिर्वाचित प्रधानमन्त्री बिपी कोइरालाको विभिन्न कोणबाट विश्लेषण भएको छ । हालका वर्षहरुमा राजनीतिक क्षेत्रका धेरै व्यक्तिहरुले वहाँको प्रजातान्त्रिक राजनीति, राष्ट्रवा, राजा महेन्द्रसँगको सम्बन्ध, समाजवादी चिन्तन र विशेषगरी राष्ट्रिय मेलमिलाप नीतिका बारेमा लेखेका छन् । कानुनव्यवसायीका रुप्मा कोइरालाको विश्लेषण प्रायः भएको छैन भने पनि हुन्छ अर्थात् अत्यन्त न्यून रुपमा मात्र भएको छ ।…Read the Article
This initiative was established because as two independent states, we realize that the relation between Nepal and India can and should be improved.
Currently, the relation between Nepal and India is not based on equal grounds; indeed, India has tried to view Nepal as a country it has the right to exercise its influence or even a “protective” responsibility over. This attitude is on the rise with recent economic and military advances. Over and over again, India has tried to assert its muscle on Nepal, meddling in its internal affairs and controlling its politics by manipulating the socio, political and economic hold it has in the country. India has consistently tried to exercise hegemony, which the Nepali people have tirelessly resisted, but have failed again and again. This has made the ancient land desperate. This is the sole reason why no native Nepalese would think that Indian activities or intentions are above board. However, if relations between the countries are to improve, it must be changed from an oppressor-oppressed one to one based on sovereign equality and principles of justice.
As a point of departure, India needs to understand Nepal as an independent and equal country, with its own national ego and plans and priorities, not a client country. Only then can the two countries begin working towards creating a stable, peaceful, and prosperous climate for each other in the bilateral relationship. This understanding must follow with certain other actions.
• Firstly, the Nepal-India international border, which India has forced Nepal to keep open since the last sixty-five years needs to be closed so that there is not a free and unrestricted movement across the border for either Nepali or Indians. Nepal wants this country to remain a home of Nepalese people. An open border is certainly a lasting threat.
• Secondly, as soon as the international border is closed, immigration services need to be established in place so that both the neighboring countries are better able to record and limit the flow of populations across the border.
• Thirdly, all immigrant Indians working in Nepal [who do not have citizenship certificates yet, should immediately attain time-bound work permits according to the law, so that the Government of Nepal is well-aware of the number of Indians working here and create adept policies to control that number as necessary. All Indians who do not register but serve as laborers, vendors, merchants, professionals, ghost professionals in major industries and trading groups need to return to India in a given period. There should be an end to unauthorized work to the Indians in Nepal under Indian pressure. Of course, the same policy should apply to the Nepalese working in India.
• Stemming from this point, fourthly, the Government of Nepal should encourage Nepalese working abroad (you may say the Nepalese economic refugees) in countries in the Arab world, Malaysia, and Singapore, among others, to return back to the country and fill these jobs, so that the priceless labor of Nepal is rightfully utilized within its own borders. As a good neighbor, India should help to rehabilitate them in their villages in different parts of Nepal who had to escape Nepal because of lack of opportunities due to competition of Indians within their own country.
• Fifth, the Indian government should offer citizenship certificates to all Nepalese who have been working and living in India the same way that the Nepali government was forced to do for Indian immigrants and working people in Nepal during the last few decades under Indian pressure. The natives of Nepal know how even the Constitution was sidelined to allow for the easy naturalization (claiming a mostly fake theory that they were Madhesis of Nepal who were denied citizenship). This is so that the rights and responsibilities of Nepalese in India are protected, and they are granted the same sort of privileges and attention as Indians working the same jobs.
• It is never possible to build mutual trust when many of the past bilateral treaties signed between these neighboring countries benefit one at the cost of other. Co-existence and mutual benefits are simple concepts. The treaties in the area of hydropower and water resources need to be revisited, rectified and implemented as soon as possible.
• Sixth, India should not try to involve with the people who already have Nepalese citizenship as people of India. This will never help create an integrated Nepali identity.
• Seventh, the Nepalese expect India to withdraw from Kalapani in western Nepal and return all encroached lands along the Nepal India international border.
These are not any new suggestions. The Harka Gurung Report on the Internal and International Migrations in Nepal (2040/1983) is still the best document to rely on to leave Nepal for Nepalese and improve the situation here. Nepal needs to prosper, and prosper with its own peculiarities as a people in terms of their age-old demography, socio-political institutions, the Himalayan identity, religion, culture and economic potentials. What comes as new development in recent years is the sharp increase in the effort to change Nepal in unnepali way, and interference in making or unmaking government, nomination of political appointees, transfer and promotion of senior employees, and even charging somebody with corruption. Along with the sufferings as above, this all means that Nepal cannot even function within a democracy and the system of the rule of law.
Currently, India pretends that Nepal is under its security umbrella. It is unwarranted. Nepal is certainly struggling with natural disasters, increase in poverty, environmental degradation, and the challenges of law and order. But they are our problems.. Our Himals, mountains, rivers and streams have been the gift of god. We did not create them to bring rains or create flood, or other natural calamities in the downstream countries. They should not be taken as a security issue for Indian interference. Nepal is a Nepalese responsibility.
By no means should India compromise its security; indeed, India should tighten its border security, build fences, mobilize army and police, and install facilities of whatever type that befits India’s security needs along its side of the international border or anywhere in its territory. It may also do many other things to assure its citizens are protected. Nepal should not want India relaxing its security for any purpose. What it does not mean is for India to meddle in Nepal’s internal affairs through actions in the government or attempts to influence Nepal’s constitutional functionaries, or act for Nepal in Nepal’s territory under its security perception. This will never be acceptable. The educated Nepalis will continue to take it as security threat for their country.
These are some of the few first steps that the two countries can agree upon so as to improve their relations with each other.
(Dr Bipin Adhikari’s comments on Mr Alizedney paper presented in 2015 ALIN General Meeting and International Conference September 17, 2015, Seol, Korea)
Mr Alizedney M. Ditucalan paper on The Bangsamoro Basic Law: The Philippine Model of Legislative Peace Settlement and Its Constitutional Ramifications is a very well written piece of article on the struggle to reconcile the differences between the Moro people’s right to self determination in Mindanao and the Philippine state’s national interests.
As an outsider, it is often difficult to comment on issues that we have very little inside information on. However, this article must be commended on its intelligible structure and an eloquent description of events and underlying issues. This has helped paint quite the picture and made it relatively uncomplicated to understand the major issues.
As I understand, there is currently a proposed Bill called the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) based on the longstanding agreements, notably the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro (FAB), between the Government of Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is under extensive discussions in both the chambers of the parliament. If adopted, the Basic Law will codify the aspirations of the past agreements and usher in changes that could have a lot of ramifications for both the state and the Bangsamoro autonomous region.
Moreover, some of the provisions contained in the past agreements, i.e. Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro and Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro have been deemed incompatible with the 1987 Constitution. In light of this, the author seeks to find a middle ground between balancing the state’s interests vis-à-vis the constitution, on the one hand, and the Moro people’s aspirations on the other. In doing so, there are some constitutional issues that need to be resolved. At this point, I would like to enquire whether the Bangsamoro Question is an isolated event in Philippine polity or are there other political forces driven by different ethnic/religious groups simultaneously seeking similar rights to autonomy and self determination? This will bring in the challenge for the state to ensuring equality to all in its dealings.
The historical context on the Bangsamoro peace settlement provides an intriguing backdrop for a constitutional enthusiast like me to understand the nature of the conflict in Philippines. The perennial struggle between the state and the Moros, as the author has explained, is not just confined to armed struggle but extends to the power struggle between the major constitutional structures of the nation, i.e. Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is apparent reading from the historical context that the struggle has been a long one lasting decades. It is also undeniably apparent that efforts have been made in the past to initiate peace process between the opposing forces, namely the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, Final Peace Agreement 1996. However, such efforts have been thwarted by either the policy changes at the top vis-à-vis change in administration or through the judicial decisions against the agreements, namely the striking down of the MOA-AD as unconstitutional. In either of the cases, it seems both the parties were at a loss as the struggle for peace continued. At this point, it would be appropriate to highlight the national view on the state of proceedings between the GPH and the MILF. Are majority of the Pilipino people pro-BBL or are they against the enactment of BBL? This could be an intriguing political question in our present context.
In the current scenario, it has been opined that a resolution can at last be achieved to put an end, once and for all, to the constant struggle through the enactment of the Basic Law. However, despite the longing for peace from both sides, implementing the agreements as the author has eloquently pointed out is a tricky scenario. First of all, the enactment of Basic Law is a legislative prerogative and as such the Congress holds the final say or utmost discretion in the formalizing process without any express obligations to enact the requisite law. Secondly, the constitutionalism of the BBL needs to be thoroughly reviewed. As the author pointed out, judicial review is inevitable and if the BBL is to survive such scrutiny from the judiciary later on then active discussions on the constitutionality of the enshrined provisions of the BBL must be discussed at the earliest. In light of this, it begs the question, how prevalent is “judicial activism”1 in Philippines? Do the judges favor the enactment of BBL or have they remained neutral in the process?
In this context, the issue of form of governance in Bangsamoro is one of the contentious issues due to the perceived incompatibility of a presidential system at the national level and parliamentary system at the autonomous region. Citing examples from UK, France and the 1973 Constitution of Philippines, the author stresses that the concept of mixed system is in fact workable and therefore not unconstitutional. Similarly, the second major opposition to the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro and Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro were the compatibility of the parliamentary form of governance with the Section 18 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution. In this context, the author opined that the constitution grants the Congress power to define the “basic structure of the government” as long as it contains a representative and elective departments, i.e. legislative and executive.
The third issue was whether or not Congress can abolish the present Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and replace it with Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. In answering this, the Constitutional doctrine whereby a former legislature cannot bind a successive legislature has been used as a persuasive argument. The principle in Duarte v Dade, furthers this concept by highlighting that the court has the duty to strike down laws that attempt to limit the power of Congress to amend or repeal laws. These are the reservations of the GPH and the critics against the enactment of BBL. However, there aren’t any mentions of the reservations of the MILF or the Moros regarding the impending enactment of BBL. Are the Moros completely satisfied with the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro and Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro? Have all their demands been met? Are there any specific rights or guarantees that have been omitted from the agreements which the Moros would like to incorporate?
The concern that the Bangsamoro political entity is akin to sub-state that will cause dismemberment of the Philippine territory is a valid concern. This is something being actively discussed in Nepal currently in light of the current federalization process. However, the context of asymmetric relationship is a concept designed to allow more leeway to the autonomous regions to exercise more power and entertain less intervention from the national government. This will also provide assurances to the Moros that their special historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics have been acknowledged by the state. In light of this, as the author has pointed out, the relationship must be clearly defined and the powers clearly delineated between the National Government and the Bangsamoro to avoid any future clashes between authorities. In this regard, I have a few queries:
Is the distribution of money between the National Government and the Autonomous Region not a big debate in the Philippines? I understand that Philippines is a unitary state, however, the issue of distribution of money does not seem to be part of the debate. Is there a particular reason for that?
What structures have been put in place to adjudicate the disputes arising between the autonomous region and other regions? Which laws would prevail? Having a separate legislative department means that the autonomous region will have the power to enact its own laws. Which laws would prevail in cases of dispute between a national legislation and Moros legislation?
Another major objection to the enactment of Basic Law is the incompatibility, with the 1987 Constitution, of the grant of specific powers such as concurrent powers and exclusive powers to the Bangsamoro. Critics have sought to argue that granting Bangsamoro with such powers means the abdication of the indivisible powers of the state. The author, in contrast, argues that this in fact is not the case. A redefining of decentralization would put the granting of such delegation of powers within the boundaries of the 1987 Constitution. This is the norm in modern day unitary states and according to the author, Government of Phillipines and the Moros would both benefit from such an arrangement. At this point, the argument could be further strengthened with comparative models of nations favoring the decentralization of powers from the centre to the regional levels. Also, the demographic of the Moros in contrast to the other ethnicities, religions or communities residing in the Philippines could be another pertinent point mentioning in the research paper.
Finally, the author touches upon the uncertainty regarding the final draft of the Basic Law. At present, there are three versions of the Bill, each containing slightly different provisions from one another. This could be problematic as drastic alterations to the agreement would not be acceptable to the Moros. The third Bill, proposed as Marcus’s substitute Bill, has already been deemed unacceptable by the MILF. The Bicameral Conference Committee of the Congress has been entrusted to reconcile the conflicting versions of the two Houses of Congress. This committee has the power to amend, substitute or re-create the Bill depending upon the circumstances. Thus, the onus is on the committee to finalize a Bill that is acceptable to all the parties, promotes justice, rule of law, establishes order and protects and promotes the rights of individuals in society.
In this scenario, it is pertinent to enquire the inclusiveness of the Pilipino Congress as regards to the Moros. How well are the Moros represented within the Pilipino congress? Do they hold a large minority capable of being taken seriously or a smaller minority which could be easily brushed aside? Furthermore, how well are the Moros represented within the Bicameral Conference Committee? Lastly, are there any provisions for affirmative action ensuring the appropriate representation of the Moros within the Pilipino Congress?
This paper helped me draw a lot of parallels with my own country where there are a lot of groups, much akin to the Moros, seeking similar autonomy within federal Nepal. The armed rebellion of the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the state in 2007. Following this, some of the Maoist cadres were also integrated in the state armed forces. The armed rebellion sought to end the Monarchical state structure of Nepal and create a Federal Democratic Republic devoid of alienation, discrimination of the marginalized communities.
In light of this, Nepal has endeavored to promulgate a new Constitution keeping in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2007. In doing so, we have grappled with a lot of the similar issues currently being discussed in the Philippines regarding the Bangsamoro Question. In the same vein, the impending formation of federal states, based on ethnic diversities, in Nepal has generated fears of secessionist movements. Quite often rebels do not want to establish the rule of law, democratic principles and the concept of constitutionalism when they find they will be weakened by these formulations. The efforts to create an acceptable Constitution have been largely elusive due to the constant stalemate between the opposing political forces. In the same vein, is there a possibility in the Philippines that the political process would further elongate the enactment process? Also, in Nepal, the civil society has been largely proactive and been credited for initiating rights activism and human rights movement. In the same vein, has the civil society in Philippines played a major role in the shifting of attitude among people? Have they been important in bringing the Moros under the legal regime?
In essence, peace settlement is a give and take process and justice must prevail in the given context. Very often there are instances where the give and take cannot be compromised in the Constitution. This happens largely due to the excessive demands of the people seeking outlandish pleadings from the state which cannot possibly be guaranteed in the Constitution or Basic Law if that contravenes the Constitution. In this context, how rational are the demands of the Moros? How have they been viewed not just from the author’s perspective but also the national perspective? In conclusion, I would like to congratulate the author on the enlightening piece of work.
1Judicial activism refers to judicial rulings suspected of being based on personal or political considerations rather than on existing law. It is sometimes used as an antonym of judicial restraint.
