“The overarching principle of Nepalese federalism is “cooperation, co-existence and coordination.” As the English proverb goes, “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.” The sooner the federal government involves other tiers in this process, the better the chances will of completing the transition efficiently.” 

A great transformation is ongoing at the local level in Nepal after the restructuring of the country from a unitary to a three-tier federal state, and the subsequent grassroots elections in 2017. These elections were held after a gap of 20 years (if one excludes the local elections held at the initiation of King Gyanendra in 53 municipalities in 2006, which were neither recognized by the major political parties and nor saw high voter turnout). It is high time that policymakers and local government practitioners recognize this transformation and supplement it with the necessary interventions.

The great transformation that the country is passing through has two clearly important aspects. The first aspect is the dynamism that the re-creation of the accountable form of government and the participatory framework has given to the local people after a lengthy inertia. The 2017 local elections were held for all six, newly-restructured metropolitan cities, 11 sub-metropolitan cities, 276 municipalities and 460 village bodies (now termed “rural municipalities” in English). They have developed new identities, a sense of federal stakeholders and sizable local governments. The local people are genuinely empowered. Their institutions, formal and informal, have found an opportunity to engage with the elected local government.

The great transformation that the country is passing through has two clearly important aspects. The first aspect is the dynamism that the re-creation of the accountable form of government and the participatory framework has given to the local people after a lengthy inertia. The second aspect of the transformation is obviously being brought by the constitutional provision that provides independent space to the local governments to work in their territory under the framework of the division of powers amongst the three tiers of government. Proverbial in the vernacular as ‘Ekal Anushuchi,’ Schedule 8 of the Constitution vests in the local governments 22 powers that enable them to formulate laws as necessary and implement them. 

The second aspect of the transformation is obviously being brought by the constitutional provision that provides independent space to the local governments to work in their territory under the framework of the division of powers amongst the three tiers of government. Proverbial in the vernacular as ‘Ekal Anushuchi,’ Schedule 8 of the Constitution vests in the local governments 22 powers that enable them to formulate laws as necessary and implement them. Besides, there are 15 additional concurrent powers that can be implemented by all three level of state, i.e., federation, province, and local levels, according to the framework laws enacted by the federal government. This has helped the local people to engage in long-term planning for their development instead of simply meeting their current societal needs.

These two ongoing aspects of the great transformation have left behind Nepal’s mixed experiment with decentralization. The country is experiencing power-oriented discourse in the relationship between levels of government, and on the negotiating table are leaders representing the diversity of Nepalese society. A total of 14,339 positions of representatives (approximately 41 percent) are held by women in the local government. Apart from women, there is a vast improvement in the representation of dalits, janajatis (29.3 percent) and Madhesis. Additionally, even though they will have to contest another election for leadership positions, which they are yet to win, it is clear that the playing field will not be the same for the dominant communities after their five-year sojourn in the axis of power.

While the first aspect gives vitality to the people empowered by the new Constitution, the second provides autonomy and self-government, which must be respected by both the federal and provincial governments. The combined effect of this transformation enables further impetus for democratization, equality, inclusive economic development and human rights.

The changes observed at the grassroots in Nepal indicate many positive scenarios. They have helped dispel the worries of the skeptics that the consolidation of the local governments, or the governments at the third tier, will weaken the provinces and their exercise of executive and legislative power. On the contrary, provincial governments, and especially their sub-national administrative units, will find effective local support, and the progaramme and activities that they launch will receive the necessary stimuli from the local governments. The provinces will grow further stronger in the time to come as they will concentrate on strategic policy issues and major provincial plans and priorities.

The changes observed at the grassroots in Nepal indicate many positive scenarios. They have helped dispel the worries of the skeptics that the consolidation of the local governments, or the governments at the third tier, will weaken the provinces and their exercise of executive and legislative power. On the contrary, provincial governments, and especially their sub-national administrative units, will find effective local support, and the progaramme and activities that they launch will receive the necessary stimuli from the local governments. The provinces will grow further stronger in the time to come as they will concentrate on strategic policy issues and major provincial plans and priorities.

This early trend encourages all stakeholders. While the positive trend must be appreciated, all those concerned with this process need to facilitate the resolution of issues that have surfaced in the implementation of the Constitution, options before the federal government and challenges that need to be overcome.

During the last two years, the federal government played a crucial, although somewhat rushed, role in establishing local governments, creating model laws for their consideration and changing the federal government’s own rules of the game to adjust to the new Constitution. More tasks lie ahead. Fundamentally, the federal government’s slow pace in establishing national policies in key areas of provincial and local businesses has affected the work and planning of the provincial and local governments. National policies happen to be more important to the provincial and local governments, because they clearly articulate the federal government’s thoughts and assist other governments to decipher their pathways within the executive or legislative competencies. Although the federal government is finalizing policies, it has not been able to sit with federal partners and assume policy leadership after consulting them. So even where national policies have already been adopted, for example, the National Communication Policy, the federal government has fallen short of leadership function.

Most of the statutes passed by the federal parliament in the past were connected to the policy issues, but were given way without clearing the relevant policies first. It did so to fulfill constitutionally-mandated obligations. It amended many of the existing laws to align them with the new Constitution. The government is struggling even now with at least two and half dozen bills currently being considered in either house of the federal parliament. Due to the pressure of the situation, the government has pushed these measures without first clearing vital policy issues, which would have significant implications for the proposed and discussed laws. In some important sense, provincial and local governments have been bewildered to see how they could exercise their powers, when enabling laws that have been created fall way behind and do not give them a role in explicit terms.

Despite the effort of the government to federalize the public administration of Nepal, during the last two years, the bureaucracy of the unitarian state has still been in effect with almost no change in its status. The provincial and local governments have been increasingly able to receive the necessary staff members; however, they have not been able to retain them for longer periods, and in many cases, failed to meet the local or provincial requirements. This is because the supply is not based on the particularized demands. Some elected representatives have even expressed their concerns that such public servants are reluctant to implement their governmental decisions. While the sub-national governments have been unable to create their own bureaucracy, they feel that it is absolutely important to develop a workable system of supervision and control at their level, which requires the power of appointment, transfer, a disciplinary system and control. As provincial governments have not passed their enabling laws, provincial public service commissions have not been established. Unfortunately, this has not happened because the federal government, which has the responsibility to work out framework and national standards, has not done so.

The model laws, procedures and directives with which the federal government helped the local and provincial governments were very helpful in the beginning. They were worked out in haste by the bureaucracy of the federal government and aimed at providing the basic rules of the game, while the power of the central government was transferred to the newly-elected provincial and local governments. Such laws, procedures and directives were adopted by the local governments without almost any modifications and have served their initial purpose. Now it is the time to review them and ensure that they are more provincial and local in their orientation. Many of these model laws express the biases of the senior bureaucrats rather than the commitment of the new Constitution to autonomy and self-government.

The model laws, procedures and directives with which the federal government helped the local and provincial governments were very helpful in the beginning. They were worked out in haste by the bureaucracy of the federal government and aimed at providing the basic rules of the game, while the power of the central government was transferred to the newly-elected provincial and local governments. Such laws, procedures and directives were adopted by the local governments without almost any modifications and have served their initial purpose. Now it is the time to review them and ensure that they are more provincial and local in their orientation. Many of these model laws express the biases of the senior bureaucrats rather than the commitment of the new Constitution to autonomy and self-government.

The Constitution has established the Interprovincial Council to deal with issues that have the potential of escalating in the context of centre-province relations. It is the Council of the prime minister, who presides the forum, and politically helps resolve arising issues. Importantly, the prime minister must regularize the operations of the Council and foster it as an institution that can quickly handle the arising teething problems of federalization. The local level is not directly represented in the Council, although it also faces issues that should be able to reach this forum for necessary consideration. The constitutional position is that the issues related to the friction between local governments within a province are to be handled by the provincial assembly. This might mean that a committee within the assembly will discuss the issues and offer recommendations to the full house or the provincial government. While this provision has its own merits, the federal system that the Constitution has created is a three-tier system, and the creation of necessary provisions should ensure that the third tier is enabled to participate in the Council. Even the status of an observer could be considered, and nothing will restrict the federal government from providing for this arrangement under its lawmaking power.

The same issue comes up in the case of the National Natural Resources and Finance Commission. The Constitution created the Commission to perform many essential, independent roles in determining the detailed basis and modality for the distribution of revenues out of the federal consolidated fund amongst the federal, provincial and local governments. Among other things, the Commission is required to make recommendations about equalization grants to be provided to the provincial and local governments, conditional grants, norms/standards and situation of infrastructures, the distribution of revenues between the provincial and local governments, revenue collection, ceiling of internal loans, potential disputes, environmental impact assessment, mobilization of natural resources and distribution of revenues. To a great extent, the success of federalism in Nepal will depend on the efficiency, impartiality and justice of the Commission’s decision-making.

The pace of federalization has not been satisfactory to many stakeholders. Stakeholders have officially and in unofficial gatherings expressed their concerns. The federal government needs to consistently and properly respond to these concerns. Due to the clout of the present government at all levels, the prime minister is certainly in a position to coordinate and control the outpourings. However, ad hocims is not helpful. The Constitution did not create a body such as a constitution implementation commission to advise and assist the leadership to manage the different layers of transitions based on certain principles and standards, and its absence makes the job more challenging. The option is consolidation of the cabinet office to attend the transition issue.

The pace of federalization has not been satisfactory to many stakeholders. Stakeholders have officially and in unofficial gatherings expressed their concerns. The federal government needs to consistently and properly respond to these concerns. Due to the clout of the present government at all levels, the prime minister is certainly in a position to coordinate and control the outpourings. However, ad hocims is not helpful. The Constitution did not create a body such as a constitution implementation commission to advise and assist the leadership to manage the different layers of transitions based on certain principles and standards, and its absence makes the job more challenging. The option is consolidation of the cabinet office to attend the transition issue.

Federal transition is a long, thought-out process that cannot be completed hastily. At the same time, federal transition is not meant to be a lingering process. The current situation needs to be seriously overviewed. The local governments are still far from gaining exclusive control over key sectors like their general administration, education, health, and agriculture and livestock. This prevents local governments from exercising the power so clearly guaranteed by the Constitution, and such matters need to be facilitated urgently.

The common concern of all local governments seems to be lack of human resources and expertise in all areas of their executive, legislative and judicial works. For example, they all desperately need training on the planning and management of and compliance with procurement laws. Internal rules of the provincial assemblies require revisions. The house procedures that provincial assemblies have laid down for local assemblies need substantial improvement. The village and municipal assemblies must receive adequate orientation on how to perform like local legislatures as expected under the Constitution. The success of the local legislatures also means the progress towards popular accountability, transparency and the rule of law. Civil servants under the control of the federal government, who have been basically trained and disciplined in the unitary state, have to be able to facilitate this process with a new spirit.

Evidently, the provincial governments need to boost their existing capacity to coordinate all local governments in their territory and develop territorial nexus within the province for provincial causes. This requires working with the local governments in order to develop provincial policies in all major areas of their power and creating laws and institutions that address their concerns.

The overarching principle of Nepalese federalism is “cooperation, co-existence and coordination.” As the English proverb goes, “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.” The sooner the federal government involves other tiers in this process, the better the chances will of completing the transition efficiently.

[lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com]

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The AIIB follows a six-step process for the approval and completion of projects in Asia. These are as follows: strategic programming, project identification, project preparation, Board approval, project implementation, and project completion and evaluation. All powers of the AIIB are vested in the Board of Governors. Typically, the AIIB’s long term repayment includes a five-year grace period and an interest rate of 1 to 1.5 percent.

The China-pioneered Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the first international institution created by a non-western power, has at once become relevant to Nepal and its multifarious investment needs. While the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the two international institutions established after World War II, remain active with the support of the US and the western countries, the global economic system will not remain the same after the emergence of the AIIB. Whether the new entity is taking shape and promising a change that many developing countries have been looking for is still open to question.

Nepal’s investment scenario has not changed qualitatively as far as investments in major infrastructures are concerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Nepal has encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) in many sectors, including land and food production, hydropower and infrastructure development, and the tourism sectors. And the results have been quite satisfactory; according to World Bank’s Open Data, FDI inflows into Nepal as a percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) was at its historical in 2017 at 0.789. By comparison, the same number for Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India is 1.574, 0.923, and 1.537, respectively. For a country emerging from the lasting effects of a civil war, the number is quite impressive. Yet, it is not enough.

What is being sought is also a big push. In development and welfare economics, this means that a stagnant economy requires a “big push,” a large wave of minimum investments as opposed to a sprinkle of investments, to move towards higher levels of productivity and growth of income in the economy. For Nepal, even as it secures funding from several foreign investors for large-scale infrastructural projects, this big push has not been a reality thus far. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific is of the position that “[t]he provision of adequate infrastructure, along with macroeconomic stability and a long-term development strategy, is one of the necessary conditions for sustainable economic and social development.” The opinion is certainly correct.

What is being sought is also a big push. In development and welfare economics, this means that a stagnant economy requires a “big push,” a large wave of minimum investments as opposed to a sprinkle of investments, to move towards higher levels of productivity and growth of income in the economy. For Nepal, even as it secures funding from several foreign investors for large-scale infrastructural projects, this big push has not been a reality thus far. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific is of the position that “[t]he provision of adequate infrastructure, along with macroeconomic stability and a long-term development strategy, is one of the necessary conditions for sustainable economic and social development.” The opinion is certainly correct.

A study, for example, finds that China’s prosperity can be partly attributed to investment-led growth, and that particularly, “[i]Infrastructure development in China has significant positive contribution to growth than both private and public investment.” Moreover, another study also finds that the differences between growth performances in various parts of China can be explained by “geographical location and infrastructure endowment … The results indicate that transport facilities are a key differentiating factor in explaining the growth gap ….” Therefore, an important pointer for Nepal is that careful and deliberate investment is necessary for sustainable economic growth, especially with regards to connectivity and access.

The first ever infrastructure-targeted development bank of Nepal, the Nepal Infrastructure Bank (NIB) received its operating license in February 2019. The NIB is the first bank that is established as a public-private partnership, with the government and the public sector owning 10 and 90 percent, respectively. In a move to support the NIB, the Nepal Rastra Bank (Nepal’s central bank empowered to grant the license) has “allowed [the NIB] to issue loans up to 90 percent of its credit to core capital and domestic deposits ratio,” even though the regular limit is 80 percent. With a focus on infrastructural investment as well as “construction, transportation, agriculture, energy, tourism, special economic zone, urban development and information technology,” the NIB will have an authorized capital of Rs. 40 billion.

International Opportunities for Nepal

The AIIB, beginning operations in January 2016, is anticipated to be a major financial institution of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The AIIB is a multilateral development bank, headquartered in Beijing, with 93 approved members worldwide. A $100 billion bank, the AIIB’s main focus is investment in Asia to enhance social and economic outcomes. The AIIB is constituted and governed by public international law (thereby, international administrative law), including international conventions, customary international law, and general principles of law and the rule of law.

[Table 1 AIIB Projects Proposed in Nepal]

China (26.78 percent voting power), India (7.69 percent voting power), and Russia (6.05 percent voting power) are the three largest shareholders in the AIIB. Nepal joined the AIIB in January 13, 2016 and has a total subscription of USD 80.9 million and a voting power of 0.28 percent. Since its operation, the AIIB has proposed projects in Nepal as well, mainly in the energy and infrastructural sectors (see Table 1). These projects have yet to be approved. There is little doubt that Nepal has an equal opportunity as any other Asian country to continue to attract funding for potential infrastructural projects.

Trends of the AIIB

In the three years since its inception, according to John Hurley, a policy analyst, the AIIB demonstrates three key takeaways: it continues to attract funding from other multilateral development banks (like the WB), it co-finances with such banks, and it will finance projects in countries that other institutions have typically ignored (e.g. Russia and Iran). These trends demonstrate the AIIB’s commitment to diversifying funding and diluting risks for sustainable financing. Moreover, the Bank is available for every country.

In the three years since its inception, according to John Hurley, a policy analyst, the AIIB demonstrates three key takeaways: it continues to attract funding from other multilateral development banks (like the WB), it co-finances with such banks, and it will finance projects in countries that other institutions have typically ignored (e.g. Russia and Iran). These trends demonstrate the AIIB’s commitment to diversifying funding and diluting risks for sustainable financing. Moreover, the Bank is available for every country.

Despite these features, the AIIB draws some critiques as well, including the fact that China does not differentiate between democratic and undemocratic or oppressive regimes; therefore, it worries some that there is a possibility of AIIB’s funds going into the pockets of unaccountable authorities. Additionally, although under Article 13 of the Articles of Agreement, the legal document legitimizing the operations of the AIIB, it promises to ensure its projects uphold its policies regarding environmental and social impact, some scientists worry how large-scale transport and road projects, financed inappropriately, will degrade the surrounding wildlife and environment. Concerns regarding the displacement of local populations because of infrastructural investment and corruption are rampant as well. Additionally, some critics point out China’s obvious veto power over major decisions by the AIIB as it holds the highest voting power.

China’s response to these criticisms is notable as well. Joining Western powers in upholding the international norms and standards of sustainable financing has been well-regarded as China’s attempt to curb some of the criticisms about sustainability and environmental impact. This extends to concerns about human rights as well and the involvement of international and regional banks in ensuring that international standards of human rights are upheld. Additionally, some scholars emphasize that this China-led multilateral development bank complements the existence and policies of existing western banks and is not a confrontational force to the global financial governance system.

Bretton Woods and the AIIB

Before the AIIB came the Bretton Woods system, the first international monetary systems that aimed to create an efficient foreign exchange system (based on the U.S. dollar and the value of gold) and promote international economic growth. The Bretton Woods Agreement gave way to the establishment of the IMF and the WB. The IMF has been focused on promoting international monetary cooperation, while the WB has focused on lending to developing countries for economic growth.

It is important to consider how the IMF and WB differentiate from the AIIB. For starters, membership in the Bretton Woods system was largely composed of Western countries and Japan, an alliance continued after World War II of the Allied nations. The AIIB, on the other hand, did not form post-war, focusing on repairing the damages from the war and then moving on to developmental goals. Instead, the AIIB was founded on the idea of fostering economic activity through investment and offers membership to any and all countries, regardless of their economic status in the world, with allocated voting power. Additionally, the AIIB is not only for wealthier countries, and a study finds that actually countries that are underrepresented in the global financial arena are more likely to join.

It is important to consider how the IMF and WB differentiate from the AIIB. For starters, membership in the Bretton Woods system was largely composed of Western countries and Japan, an alliance continued after World War II of the Allied nations. The AIIB, on the other hand, did not form post-war, focusing on repairing the damages from the war and then moving on to developmental goals. Instead, the AIIB was founded on the idea of fostering economic activity through investment and offers membership to any and all countries, regardless of their economic status in the world, with allocated voting power. Additionally, the AIIB is not only for wealthier countries, and a study finds that actually countries that are underrepresented in the global financial arena are more likely to join.

Additionally, the AIIB and the western multilateral development banks differ in their ideologies. The western institutions followed a liberal economic theory to promote democracy around the world. Contrastingly, the AIIB is mostly removed from domestic matters of the borrowing countries; the Articles of Agreement explicitly bars members from influencing political affairs of borrower countries. Unlike the WB, the AIIB does not require privatization or deregulation for potential borrowing countries to qualify for funding. In a way, this is helpful to some countries that face issues convincing pre-existing financial institutions to extend investments.

Another important issue for Nepal will be how much ownership Nepal can take on to construct and maintain the projects. China and other lending institutions emphasize sovereignty of the borrowing countries to lead projects, make decisions about the countries’ needs, and establish policy frameworks to reap the benefits of infrastructural projects. However, the lack of conditionality in qualifying for loans means that it will be up to Nepal to improve both governance and policy to ensure success. It will be very important for Nepal to ensure a rigid policy framework and build the capacity of its human resources in order to avoid failed projects and the subsequent debt distress.

Legal issues pertaining to AIIB in Nepal

Maintaining international levels of environmental standards is one of AIIB’s commitments for all the projects it will fund. For example, some argue that the AIIB is not “rigorous in its evaluation of mitigation measures” and vague about issues of biodiversity. In the case of projects’ effects on natural habitats, the AIIB requires a cost-benefit analysis; however, the AIIB is unclear about how it will conduct such analyses, and the ultimate argument for the construction of a project may be arbitrary with a simple defense of the economic gains outweighing environmental protection. Upholding international environmental standards are especially important for Nepal, which is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change.

In the area of labor standards as well, the AIIB is amendable to some international standards, although some scholars argue that it has fared poorly. For example, it explicitly prohibits forced labor and uses similar language that the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the WB, uses. However, while the AIIB prohibits child labor through a Minimum Age Convention, it is not party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (to which the ICF is party), which leave open some loopholes. This includes child labor moving to unregulated sectors outside the specified industries under the Minimum Age Convention.

In Nepal, child labor is very much rampant, although it has been declining, and disproportionately hurts girls; additionally, 60 percent of child labor is engaged in hazardous work. The Government of Nepal has various initiatives (including the National Master Plan (2011-2020)) to curtail child labor. It’ll be important that such national and international standards are maintained in Nepal for AIIB-funded infrastructural projects, even when AIIB itself isn’t party to such standards.

The AIIB, together with the World Bank and other such institutions, presents a great opportunity for Nepal to seek funding for various infrastructural projects. The diversity of its funding and its members is a safety net for borrower countries like Nepal, as it provides for sustainability and a system of accountability. Moreover, infrastructure-related funding is crucial for Nepal, a country that contains various isolated areas lacking simple facilities. A September 2018 study by AidData, a research lab at College of William & Mary, finds that Chinese investments, especially in the transportation sector, reduce economic inequality within and between sub national localities. “Connective infrastructure,” they find, creates positive economic spillovers and equal distribution of economic activity in the implemented areas.

As a mechanism for accountability, the AIIB drafted and received comments and recommendations from international organizations concerned with project-effected people on its Project-Affected People’s Mechanism (PPM). These organizations, in a letter to the AIIB, raised concerns over the exclusions of the principles of accessibility, transparency, and legitimacy in the PPM. It also pointed out that only 12 of its initial 60 recommendations for best practices had been adopted by the AIIB as well as specified paragraphs in the draft that were deemed problematic. The writers of the recommendation pointed the “[u]nrealistic requirements to demonstrate ‘substantial’ harm,” “[u]nreasonable preconditions to filing submissions,” as well as a “[c]omplex and rigid filing system,” among other concerns. A comprehensible and smooth process will be necessary for borrowing countries and the people affected by infrastructural project, many of whom in Nepal would be isolated indigenous communities that depend on the surrounding forests, to ensure that projects will actually bring the prosperity that they promise.

Similarly, while international dispute resolution has been used by other multilateral development banks, scholars (Radavoi and Bian (2017)) emphasizing the influence of China in the AIIB argue that China generally is reluctant to pursue dispute settlement by third parties as a mechanism for resolution and instead opts for bilateral consultation or other non-compulsory mechanisms. However, the AIIB is multilateral and often collaborates with the WB, which emphasizes dispute resolution by a third party; additionally, the November 2018 AIIB conference focused specifically on legal dispute resolution, demonstrating that it will be an important factor for AIIB-funded projects.

Conclusion

The AIIB, together with the World Bank and other such institutions, presents a great opportunity for Nepal to seek funding for various infrastructural projects. The diversity of its funding and its members is a safety net for borrower countries like Nepal, as it provides for sustainability and a system of accountability. Moreover, infrastructure-related funding is crucial for Nepal, a country that contains various isolated areas lacking simple facilities. A September 2018 study by AidData, a research lab at College of William & Mary, finds that Chinese investments, especially in the transportation sector, reduce economic inequality within and between sub national localities. “Connective infrastructure,” they find, creates positive economic spillovers and equal distribution of economic activity in the implemented areas.

Because debt distress can become a major issue for countries with low GDP, it is important for Nepal to carefully evaluate the need and anticipated returns of its investments. The process of approval for AIIB funds ensures that Nepal has the mechanisms, including technical assistance, to make such decisions. Additionally, while infrastructure investment is crucial, so is the continued investment and support of “soft infrastructures,” namely, health policies, education, and management systems for administration, urbanization, and other such factors. It is essential that physical infrastructure development is accompanied by human capital formation as well in order to ensure sustainable economic growth. The complementary growth of Nepal’s infrastructures and human capital is necessary for Nepal to realize economic growth and prosperity.

[Dr Bipin Adhikari is a constitutional expert and is currently associated with the Kathmandu University School of Law. Bidushi Adhikari is associated with Nepal Consulting Lawyers, Inc as a research assistant.]

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China and landlocked Nepal seem to have almost finalized the text of a transit protocol that is to be signed when President Bidya Devi Bhandari visits China on a four-day official tour in April 2019 for the second Belt and Road (BRI) forum. This protocol is an additional opportunity for Nepal because, besides Indian, Nepal will be able to access Chinese land and sea ports for trade. As proposed, Nepalese businessmen and traders can now access three land and four sea ports in China, including the largest port in Northern China, Tianjin Port, which could have multifarious uses for Nepal in its trade relations with other countries.

Nepal is not the first country to gain access in this way to transit countries’ ports for trade. There are 48 other countries, including five partially-recognized states, that share the status and fate of landlocked nations. Some of these countries have faced economic and developmental handicaps and have borne great costs to gain access to the high seas. Their internal structural problems coupled with their lack of access to the sea hinder or delay the pace of their development compared to countries with access. Such landlocked countries’ investment scenarios are poor, and their trade largely depends on foreign ports.

Fortunately, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 guides the international law for access to ports for landlocked countries. This right has also been reaffirmed by the United Nations GA Resolution 46/212 of December 20, 1991. Therefore, the disadvantage of landlocked countries is recognized in international law, and instruments exist to resolve common problems, at least as a matter of principle. However, new challenges continue to arise. When landlocked countries do gain access to ports, factors such as poor transport infrastructures, higher transaction costs, unreasonable fees, and road tolls raise costs even further. Additional hurdles include process delays at border checkpoints and customs, tax, and bureaucratic procedures.

Nepal’s transit pathology need not be overemphasized. The Nepal-China transit protocol should be kind to the problems that Nepal has been facing. As a means of comparison, other similarly-situated countries, such as Bolivia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, that have limited or no access to sea ports have signed similar deals with neighboring countries, like Chile, Pakistan, and China, respectively, for access. Analyzing the cases of other landlocked countries can point to the issues that could develop as Nepal accesses land and sea ports in China.

For example, the 1982 Convention exempts the traffic in transit from custom duties, taxes, and other charges; however, high costs can still be challenging. As per this provision, neighbor Chile has allowed Bolivia, a Latin American landlocked country, tariff-free access to two of Chile’s sea ports, Antofagasta and Arica, and the presence of its own custom officials. From Arica, Bolivia ships 80 percent of its exports to its trade partners, like South Korea, India, and the UAE.

Despite these advantages, trading via the Pacific Ocean proves to be very expensive in the Chilean-Bolivian route due to the high transit fees caused by the rugged terrain. After the International Court of Justice denied Bolivia’s request to compel Chile into providing Bolivia “sovereign access” in the Pacific Ocean, the Bolivian government provided three river ports on the Paraguay-Parana waterway with international classification as an alternative. Such high costs will no doubt be a consequence of Nepal’s trade via Chinese ports, especially due to the enormity of the Himalayas. Therefore, to realize the gains from this access to ports, Nepal will need to amp up the infrastructure in the Nepalese side of transit points and could attract investments from China and other Asian countries that stand to benefit from connectivity with South Asia.

High transit costs or costs associated with the trade in transit countries are of concern to Chad and the Central African Republic as well. Accusations of corruption at the Doulua port in Cameroon have prompted officials from the previous two countries to investigate the proceedings at the port and seek (albeit more expensive) alternative ports for trade, including Cotonou in Benin. Importers say the transit costs include paying at not only the the checkpoint and customs, but also to the police and military personnel on the road, as a form of bribery, which Cameroon denies.

Additionally, although the 1982 Convention ensures rights for landlocked nations, such rights are subject to bilateral or multilateral agreements between landlocked and transit states. The quality of such agreements depends on the quality of relationship between the two types of states, their perception of each other, and the nature of the bilateral or multilateral agreements by which they can both abide. Arising problems strain bilateral relationships, negotiations could suffer, and the willingness to help each other may disappear. An example is complications with blockades in the Nepal-India relationship with their respective statuses as landlocked and transit countries. This environment falls short of the cooperation required for realization of free transit.

Ultimately, what prevails is not the rights of transit states (as they are not absolute rights) but the level of political will and commitment of transit states to generate benefits for both sides. Again, as the Bayeh (2015) paper notes, “… the [1982 Convention] does not put a commitment on the transit states to refrain from creating constraints for landlocked states as sub article 3 gives complete rights to the transit states to take all measures necessary to ensure that the transit of land-locked states in no way contravenes their legitimate interest, though whether it is possible to totally stop passage or on certain occasions is not clear.”

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement is an example of how relationships between countries effect bilateral agreements regarding transit trade. Signed in 2010, this agreement allowed Afghanistan to import duty-free goods through Pakistan’s sea ports. However, the agreement did not allow for bilateral trade between Afghanistan and India through Pakistan’s ports, as although Afghan goods could reach the Pakistan-India border to be imported, Indian goods could not be brought back to Afghanistan. Consequently, as Afghanistan’s trade partners have diversified, it has been emphasized that trade with Pakistan has continued to decrease despite this transit agreement.

Following growing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the latter’s implementation of blockades during political disagreements, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed a trilateral transit agreement in May 2016. The agreement was a pact to establish the Chahabar Port in southeastern Iran on the Gulf of Oman as a transit hub for the three countries. The Port has now been handed over to a state-owned Indian company for operation, and India views this Port as a way to bypass Pakistan and extend its reach into Central Asia.

Nepal considers the transit through China as not only an addition to its access to India’s ports, but also as an openness that could have immense potential for development of Nepal. In the context of the BRI, such potential includes additional Chinese investment in Nepal in heavy infrastructures like hydropower plants, railways, airports, roads, and tunnels as well as the promotion of Nepali agricultural and tourism sectors. These investments could regenerate Nepal, strengthen Nepal’s exporting capacity, and provide meaning to transit protocols being worked out by Nepal and China.

Importantly, facilities provided by India as a transit state to Nepal have been generous overall, and Nepal enjoys closer and commercially-viable access to ports assigned by India when compared to Chinese offers. However, when there has been bilateral issues between India and Nepal, they have largely been politics-related and have always affected the Nepalese’s morale as a country. The same issues of what the Chinese side can offer to avoid a similar fate is of importance here.

This transit treaty faces an enormous physical challenge, the Himalayas, in its realization, and export concessions to Nepal is only one aspect of the deal. The Nepal-China transit protocol has to be commercially-viable to match or overcome the access, competitive prices, and lingual and cultural similarities that India offers Nepal. To realize the full potential of the transit access, Nepal and China will need to work together to evaluate Nepal’s needs as a neighbor in order to facilitate the use of China’s ports; the two countries also need to ensure that China is able to support, legally and financially, the long-term and continued growth of trade via its ports through favorable agreements and the development of infrastructure.

Landlocked countries have an opportunity to leverage their position in unique ways if they are strategically located, as is the case for Nepal. Mongolia, a landlocked country lying between the emerging powers in Asia (Soviet Union and China), was in a similar situation back in the early 1990s. Its trade was largely monopolized with the then Soviet Union. In 1991, after Mongolia’s economy had been suffering following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of gasoline from its economy, Mongolia turned to China to gain access to its port of Tianjin and open up to the world.

By 2016, the port linked sea-to-railway container transport, and has a railway connection all the way to Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia. Presently, Mongolia looks to leverage its strategic location between Russia and China that enables China’s access into Europe via rail from Ulaanbaatar to Moscow and then to Europe. Mongolia’s case demonstrates that there is a need for Nepal, also sandwiched between two transit countries, to leverage its position as a gateway into either country by supporting the investment of infrastructure within the country that will create advantageous access to these transit hubs.

Nepal is strategically situated to reap the benefits of being a gateway into the South Asian market. While the transit protocol is a step towards this end, it is by no means a comprehensive one. Nepal and China will need to work closely together to ensure the development of systems and facilities that will truly foster trade and connectivity between the two countries and between China and other South Asian countries. This will require a favorable environment and a fast-paced process as well.

[Dr Bipin Adhikari is a constitutional expert and is currently associated with the Kathmandu University School of Law. Bidushi Adhikari is associated with Nepal Consulting Lawyers, Inc as a research assistant].

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